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The low ex ante expected returns in panic states are consistent with a conditionally high 
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by other factors. These results are robust across multiple time periods, international equity 
markets, and other asset classes. 
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 1. Introduction 
A momentum strategy is a bet on past returns pre-
dicting the cross section of future returns, typically im-
plemented by buying past winners and selling past losers.
Momentum is pervasive: the academic literature shows the
eﬃcacy of momentum strategies across multiple time pe-
riods, in many markets, and in numerous asset classes. 1 ∗ Corresponding author at: Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT 
USA. Tel: (203) 436-5361; Fax: (203) 742-3257. 
E-mail address: Tobias.Moskowitz@yale.edu (T.J. Moskowitz). 
1 Momentum strategies were ﬁrst shown in US common stock re- 
turns from 1965 to 1989 by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Asness 
(1994) , by sorting ﬁrms on the basis of three- to 12-month past re- 
turns. Subsequently, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show the continuing 
eﬃcacy of US equity momentum portfolios in common stock returns in 
the 1990 to 1998 period. Israel and Moskowitz (2013) show the robust- 
ness of momentum prior to and after these studies from 1927 to 1965 
and from 1990 to 2012. Evidence of momentum going back to the Vic- 
torian age from Chabot, Ghysels, and Jagannathan (2009) and for 1801 
to 2012 from Geczy and Samonov (2015) in what the authors call “the 
world’s longest backtest.” Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ﬁnd momen- 
tum in industry portfolios. Rouwenhorst (1998) ; 1999 ) ﬁnds momentum 
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( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). However, the strong positive average returns and
Sharpe ratios of momentum strategies are punctuated with
occasional crashes. Like the returns to the carry trade in
currencies (e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2008 ),
momentum returns are negatively skewed, and the neg-
ative returns can be pronounced and persistent. In our
1927–2013 US equity sample, the two worst months for a
momentum strategy that buys the top decile of past 12-
month winners and shorts the bottom decile of losers are
consecutive: July and August of 1932. Over this short pe-
riod, the past-loser decile portfolio returned 232% and the
past-winner decile portfolio had a gain of only 32%. In
a more recent crash, over the three-month period from
March to May of 2009, the past-loser decile rose by 163%
and the decile portfolio of past winners gained only 8%. in developed and emerging equity markets, respectively. Asness, Liew, and 
Stevens (1997) ﬁnd momentum in country indices. Okunev and White 
(2003) ﬁnd momentum in currencies; Erb and Harvey (2006) in com- 
modities and Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) in exchange traded 
futures contracts. Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) integrate this 
evidence across markets and asset classes and ﬁnd momentum in bonds 
as well. 
article under the CC BY license 
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 We investigate the impact and potential predictability 
of these momentum crashes, which appear to be a key 
and robust feature of momentum strategies. We ﬁnd that 
crashes tend to occur in times of market stress, when 
the market has fallen and ex ante measures of volatility 
are high, coupled with an abrupt rise in contemporaneous 
market returns. 
Our result is consistent with that of Cooper, Gutier- 
rez, and Hameed (2004) and Stivers and Sun (2010) , who 
ﬁnd, respectively, that the momentum premium falls when 
the past three-year market return has been negative and 
that the momentum premium is low when market volatil- 
ity is high. Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) offer 
a behavioral explanation for these facts that may also be 
consistent with momentum performing particularly poorly 
during market rebounds if those are also times when as- 
sets become more mispriced. However, we investigate an- 
other source for these crashes by examining conditional 
risk measures. 
The patterns we ﬁnd are suggestive of the changing 
beta of the momentum portfolio partly driving the mo- 
mentum crashes. The time variation in betas of return- 
sorted portfolios was ﬁrst shown by Kothari and Shanken 
(1992) , who argue that, by their nature, past-return sorted 
portfolios have signiﬁcant time-varying exposure to sys- 
tematic factors. Because momentum strategies are long 
past winners and short past losers, they have positive load- 
ings on factors which have had a positive realization, and 
negative loadings on factors that have had negative re- 
alizations, over the formation period of the momentum 
strategy. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) apply Kothari and Shanken’s 
insights to price momentum strategies. Intuitively, the re- 
sult is straightforward, if not often appreciated: when the 
market has fallen signiﬁcantly over the momentum forma- 
tion period (in our case from 12 months ago to one month 
ago) a good chance exists that the ﬁrms that fell in tandem 
with the market were and are high-beta ﬁrms, and those 
that performed the best were low-beta ﬁrms. Thus, follow- 
ing market declines, the momentum portfolio is likely to 
be long low-beta stocks (the past winners) and short high- 
beta stocks (the past losers). We verify empirically that 
dramatic time variation exists in the betas of momentum 
portfolios. We ﬁnd that, following major market declines, 
betas for the past-loser decile can rise above 3 and fall 
below 0.5 for past winners. Hence, when the market re- 
bounds quickly, momentum strategies crash because they 
have a conditionally large negative beta. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) argue that performance of 
momentum strategies is dramatically improved, particu- 
larly in the pre-World War II era, by dynamically hedg- 
ing market and size risk. However, their hedged portfo- 
lio is constructed based on forward-looking betas, and is 
therefore not an implementable strategy. We show that 
this results in a strong bias in estimated returns and that 
a hedging strategy based on ex ante betas does not ex- 
hibit the performance improvement noted in Grundy and 
Martin (2001) . 
The source of the bias is a striking correlation of the 
loser-portfolio beta with the contemporaneous return on 
the market. Using a Henriksson and Merton (1981) speciﬁ- cation, we calculate up- and down-betas for the momen- 
tum portfolios and show that, in a bear market, a mo- 
mentum portfolio’s up-market beta is more than double its 
down-market beta ( −1 . 51 versus −0 . 70 with a t -statistic of
the difference = 4 . 5 ). Outside of bear markets, there is no
statistically reliable difference in betas. 
More detailed analysis reveals that most of the up- ver- 
sus down-beta asymmetry in bear markets is driven by 
the past losers. This pattern in dynamic betas of the loser 
portfolio implies that momentum strategies in bear mar- 
kets behave like written call options on the market; that 
is, when the market falls, they gain a little, but when the 
market rises, they lose much. 
Consistent with the written call option like behavior 
of the momentum strategy in bear markets, we show that 
the momentum premium is correlated with the strategy’s 
time-varying exposure to volatility risk. Using volatility 
index (VIX) imputed variance swap returns, we ﬁnd that 
the momentum strategy payoff has a strong negative ex- 
posure to innovations in market variance in bear markets, 
but not in normal (bull) markets. However, we also show 
that hedging out this time- varying exposure to market 
variance (by buying Standard & Poor’s (S&P) variance 
swaps in bear markets, for instance) does not restore 
the proﬁtability of momentum in bear markets. Hence, 
time-varying exposure to volatility risk does not explain 
the time variation in the momentum premium. 
Using the insights developed about the forecastability 
of momentum payoffs, and the fact that the momentum 
strategy volatility is itself predictable and distinct from 
the predictability in its mean return, we design an opti- 
mal dynamic momentum strategy in which the winner- 
minus-loser (WML) portfolio is levered up or down over 
time so as to maximize the unconditional Sharpe ratio of 
the portfolio. We ﬁrst show theoretically that, to maximize 
the unconditional Sharpe ratio, a dynamic strategy should 
scale the WML weight at each particular time so that the 
dynamic strategy’s conditional volatility is proportional to 
the conditional Sharpe ratio of the strategy. This insight 
comes directly from an intertemporal version of the stan- 
dard Markowitz (1952) optimization problem. Then, using 
the results from our analysis on the forecastability of both 
the momentum premium and momentum volatility, we es- 
timate these conditional moments to generate the dynamic 
weights. 
We ﬁnd that the optimal dynamic strategy signiﬁcantly 
outperforms the standard static momentum strategy, more 
than doubling its Sharpe ratio and delivering signiﬁcant 
positive alpha relative to the market, Fama and French fac- 
tors, the static momentum portfolio, and conditional ver- 
sions of all of these models that allow betas to vary in the 
crash states. In addition, the dynamic momentum strat- 
egy signiﬁcantly outperforms constant volatility momen- 
tum strategies suggested in the literature (e.g., Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015) ), producing positive alpha relative to 
the constant volatility strategy and capturing the constant 
volatility strategy’s returns in spanning tests. The dynamic 
strategy not only helps smooth the volatility of momen- 
tum portfolios, as does the constant volatility approach, 
but also exploits the strong forecastability of the momen- 
tum premium. 
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2 Daily and monthly returns to these portfolios, and additional details 
on their construction, are available at Kent Daniel’s website: http://www. 
kentdaniel.net/data.php . 
3 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data _ library. 
html . Given the paucity of momentum crashes and the perni-
cious effects of data mining from an ever-expanding search
across studies (and in practice) for strategies that improve
performance, we challenge the robustness of our ﬁndings
by replicating the results in different sample periods, four
different equity markets, and ﬁve distinct asset classes.
Across different time periods, markets, and asset classes,
we ﬁnd remarkably consistent results. First, the results
are robust in every quarter-century subsample in US
equities. Second, momentum strategies in all markets and
asset classes suffer from crashes, which are consistently
driven by the conditional beta and option-like feature of
losers. The same option-like behavior of losers in bear
markets is present in Europe, Japan, and the UK and is a
feature of index futures-, commodity-, ﬁxed income-, and
currency-momentum strategies. Third, the same dynamic
momentum strategy applied in these alternative markets
and asset classes is ubiquitously successful in generating
superior performance over the static and constant volatil-
ity momentum strategies in each market and asset class.
The additional improvement from dynamic weighting is
large enough to produce signiﬁcant momentum proﬁts
even in markets in which the static momentum strategy
has famously failed to yield positive proﬁts, e.g., Japan.
Taken together, and applied across all markets and asset
classes, an implementable dynamic momentum strategy
delivers an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.19, which is four
times larger than that of the static momentum strategy
applied to US equities over the same period and thus
poses an even greater challenge for rational asset pricing
models ( Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991 ). 
Finally, we consider several possible explanations for
the option-like behavior of momentum payoffs, particularly
for losers. For equity momentum strategies, one possibility
is that the optionality arises because a share of common
stock is a call option on the underlying ﬁrm’s assets when
there is debt in the capital structure ( Merton, 1974 ). Partic-
ularly in distressed periods when this option-like behav-
ior is manifested, the underlying ﬁrm values among past
losers have generally suffered severely and are, therefore
potentially much closer to a level in which the option con-
vexity is strong. The past winners, in contrast, would not
have suffered the same losses and are likely still in-the-
money. While this explanation seems to have merit for eq-
uity momentum portfolios, this hypothesis does not seem
applicable for index future, commodity, ﬁxed income, and
currency momentum, which also exhibit option-like behav-
ior. In the conclusion, we brieﬂy discuss a behaviorally mo-
tivated possible explanation for these option-like features
that could apply to all asset classes, but a fuller under-
standing of these convex payoffs is an open area for future
research. 
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the data and portfolio construction and dissects
momentum crashes in US equities. Section 3 measures the
conditional betas and option-like payoffs of losers and as-
sesses to what extent these crashes are predictable based
on these insights. Section 4 examines the performance of
an optimal dynamic strategy based on our ﬁndings and
whether its performance can be explained by dynamic
loadings on other known factors or other momentumstrategies proposed in the literature. Section 5 examines
the robustness of our ﬁndings in different time periods,
international equity markets, and other asset classes.
Section 6 concludes by speculating about the sources of
the premia we observe and discusses areas for future
research. 
2. US equity momentum 
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of
momentum in US common stocks over the 1927–2013 time
period. 
2.1. US equity data and momentum portfolio construction 
Our principal data source is the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP). We construct monthly and daily
momentum decile portfolios, both of which are rebalanced
at the end of each month. The universe starts with all
ﬁrms listed on NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq as of the forma-
tion date, using only the returns of common shares (with
CRSP sharecode of 10 or 11). We require that a ﬁrm have
a valid share price and number of shares as of the forma-
tion date and that there be a minimum of eight monthly
returns over the past 11 months, skipping the most recent
month, which is our formation period. Following conven-
tion and CRSP availability, all prices are closing prices, and
all returns are from close to close. 
To form the momentum portfolios, we ﬁrst rank stocks
based on their cumulative returns from 12 months before
to one month before the formation date (i.e., the t − 12
to t − 2 -month returns), where, consistent with the liter-
ature ( Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Asness, 1994; Fama
and French, 1996 ), we use a one-month gap between the
end of the ranking period and the start of the holding pe-
riod to avoid the short-term reversals shown by Jegadeesh
(1990) and Lehmann (1990) . All ﬁrms meeting the data re-
quirements are then placed into one of ten decile portfo-
lios based on this ranking, where portfolio 10 represents
the winners (those with the highest past returns) and port-
folio 1 the losers. The value-weighted (VW) holding pe-
riod returns of the decile portfolios are computed, in which
portfolio membership does not change within a month ex-
cept in the case of delisting. 2 
The market return is the value weighted index of all
listed ﬁrms in CRSP and the risk free rate series is the one-
month Treasury bill rate, both obtained from Ken French’s
data library. 3 We convert the monthly risk-free rate series
to a daily series by converting the risk-free rate at the be-
ginning of each month to a daily rate and assuming that
that daily rate is valid throughout the month. 
2.2. Momentum portfolio performance 
Fig. 1 presents the cumulative monthly returns from
1927:01 to 2013:03 for investments in the risk-free asset,
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Fig. 1. Winners and losers, 1927–2013. Plotted are the cumulative returns to four assets: (1) the risk-free asset; (2) the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index; (3) the bottom decile “past loser” portfolio and (4) the top decile “past winner” portfolio over the full sample period 
1927:01 to 2013:03. To the right of the plot we tabulate the ﬁnal dollar values for each of the four portfolios, given a $1 investment in January 1927. 
Table 1 
Momentum portfolio characteristics, 1927:01–2013:03. 
This table presents characteristics of the monthly momentum decile portfolio excess returns over the 87-year full sample period from 1927:01 through 
2013:03. The decile 1 portfolio—the loser portfolio—contains the 10% of stocks with the worst losses, and decile 10—the winner portfolio—contains the 10% 
of the stocks with the largest gains. WML is the zero-investment winner-minus-loser portfolio which is long the Decile 1 and short the Decile 10 portfolio. 
The mean excess return, standard deviation, and alpha are in percent, and annualized. SR denotes the annualized Sharpe Ratio. The α, t ( α), and β are 
estimated from a full-period regression of each decile portfolio’s excess return on the excess Center for Research in Securities Prices value-weighted index. 
For all portfolios except WML, sk (m) denotes the full-period realized skewness of the monthly log returns (not excess) to the portfolios and sk (d) denotes 
the full-period realized skewness of the daily log returns. For WML, sk is the realized skewness of log (1 + r WML + r f ) . 
Return statistic Momentum decile portfolios WML Market 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
r − r f −2.5 2.9 2.9 6.4 7.1 7.1 9.2 10.4 11.3 15.3 17.9 7.7 
σ 36.5 30.5 25.9 23.2 21.3 20.2 19.5 19.0 20.3 23.7 30.0 18.8 
α −14.7 −7.8 −6.4 −2.1 −0.9 −0.6 1.8 3.2 3.8 7.5 22.2 0 
t ( α) ( −6.7) ( −4.7) ( −5.3) ( −2.1) ( −1.1) ( −1.0) (2.8) (4.5) (4.3) (5.1) (7.3) (0) 
β 1.61 1.41 1.23 1.13 1.05 1.02 0.98 0.95 0.99 1.03 −0.58 1 
SR −0.07 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.60 0.41 
sk (m) 0.09 −0.05 −0.19 0.21 −0.13 −0.30 −0.55 −0.54 −0.76 −0.82 −4.70 −0.57 
sk (d) 0.12 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.10 −0.10 −0.44 −0.66 −0.67 −0.61 −1.18 −0.44 the market portfolio, the bottom decile past loser portfolio, 
and the top decile past winner portfolio. On the right side 
of the plot, we present the ﬁnal dollar values for each of 
the four portfolios, given a $1 investment in January 1927 
(and assuming no transaction costs). 
Consistent with the existing literature, a strong momen- 
tum premium emerges over the last century. The winners 
signiﬁcantly outperform the losers and by much more than 
equities have outperformed Treasuries. Table 1 presents re- 
turn moments for the momentum decile portfolios over 
this period. The winner decile excess return averages 15.3% 
per year, and the loser portfolio averages - 2.5% per year. 
In contrast, the average excess market return is 7.6%. The Sharpe ratio of the WML portfolio is 0.71, and that of the 
market is 0.40. Over this period, the beta of the WML port- 
folio is negative, −0.58, giving it an unconditional capi- 
tal asset pricing model (CAPM) alpha of 22.3% per year 
( t -statistic = 8.5). Consistent with the high alpha, an ex 
post optimal combination of the market and WML portfo- 
lio has a Sharpe ratio more than double that of the market. 
2.3. Momentum crashes 
The momentum strategy’s average returns are large and 
highly statistically signiﬁcant, but since 1927 there have 
been a number of long periods over which momentum 
K. Daniel, T.J. Moskowitz / Journal of Financial Economics 122 (2016) 221–247 225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 We use ten daily lags of the market return in estimating the market 
betas. We estimate a daily regression speciﬁcation of the form 
˜ re i,t = β0 ˜ re m,t + β1 ˜ re m,t−1 + · · · + β10 ˜ re m,t−10 + ˜  i,t 
and then report the sum of the estimated coeﬃcients ˆ β0 + ˆ β1 + · · · + ˆ β10 . 
Particularly for the past loser portfolios, and especially in the pre-WWII 
period, the lagged coeﬃcients are strongly signiﬁcant, suggesting that 
market wide information is incorporated into the prices of many of the 
ﬁrms in these portfolios over the span of multiple days. See Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) . under-performed dramatically. Fig. 1 highlights two mo-
mentum crashes June 1932 to December 1939 and March
2009 to March 2013. These periods represent the two
largest sustained drawdown periods for the momentum
strategy and are selected purposely to illustrate the crashes
we study more generally in this paper. The starting dates
for these two periods are not selected randomly March
2009 and June 1932 are, respectively, the market bottoms
following the stock market decline associated with the re-
cent ﬁnancial crisis and with the market decline from the
great depression. 
Zeroing in on these crash periods, Fig. 2 shows the cu-
mulative daily returns to the same set of portfolios from
Fig. 1 —risk-free, market, past losers, past winners—over
these subsamples. Over both of these periods, the loser
portfolio strongly outperforms the winner portfolio. From
March 8, 2009 to March 28, 2013, the losers produce more
than twice the proﬁts of the winners, which also under-
perform the market over this period. From June 1, 1932 to
December 30, 1939 the losers outperform the winners by
50%. 
Table 1 also shows that the winner portfolios are con-
siderably more negatively skewed (monthly and daily) than
the loser portfolios. While the winners still outperform the
losers over time, the Sharpe ratio and alpha understate
the signiﬁcance of these crashes. Looking at the skewness
of the portfolios, winners become more negatively skewed
moving to more extreme deciles. For the top winner decile
portfolio, the monthly (daily) skewness is −0.82 ( −0.61),
and while for the most extreme bottom decile of losers
the skewness is 0.09 (0.12). The WML portfolio over this
full sample period has a monthly (daily) skewness of −4.70
( −1.18). 
Table 2 presents the 15 worst monthly returns to the
WML strategy, as well as the lagged two-year returns
on the market and the contemporaneous monthly mar-
ket return. Five key points emerge from Table 2 and from
Figs. 1 and 2 . 
1. While past winners have generally outperformed past
losers, there are relatively long periods over which mo-
mentum experiences severe losses or crashes. 
2. Fourteen of the 15 worst momentum returns occur
when the lagged two-year market return is negative. All
occur in months in which the market rose contempora-
neously, often in a dramatic fashion. 
3. The clustering evident in Table 2 and in the daily cumu-
lative returns in Fig. 2 makes it clear that the crashes
have relatively long duration. They do not occur over
the span of minutes or days; a crash is not a Poisson
jump. They take place slowly, over the span of multiple
months. 
4. Similarly, the extreme losses are clustered. The two
worst months for momentum are back-to-back, in July
and August of 1932, following a market decline of
roughly 90% from the 1929 peak. March and April of
2009 are the seventh and fourth worst momentum
months, respectively, and April and May of 1933 are the
sixth and 12th worst. Three of the ten worst momen-
tum monthly returns are from 2009, a three-month pe-
riod in which the market rose dramatically and volatil-ity fell. While it might not seem surprising that the
most extreme returns occur in periods of high volatility,
the effect is asymmetric for losses versus gains. The ex-
treme momentum gains are not nearly as large in mag-
nitude or as concentrated in time. 
5. Closer examination reveals that the crash performance
is mostly attributable to the short side or the perfor-
mance of losers. For example, in July and August of
1932, the market rose by 82%. Over these two months,
the winner decile rose by 32%, but the loser decile was
up by 232%. Similarly, over the three- month period
from March to May of 2009, the market was up by 26%,
but the loser decile was up by 163%. Thus, to the extent
that the strong momentum reversals we observe in the
data can be characterized as a crash, they are a crash in
which the short side of the portfolio—the losers—crash
up, not down. 
Table 2 also suggests that large changes in market beta
can help to explain some of the large negative returns
earned by momentum strategies. For example, as of the
beginning of March 2009, the ﬁrms in the loser decile
portfolio were, on average, down from their peak by 84%.
These ﬁrms included those hit hardest by the ﬁnancial cri-
sis: Citigroup, Bank of America, Ford, GM, and International
Paper (which was highly levered). In contrast, the past
winner portfolio was composed of defensive or counter
cyclical ﬁrms such as Autozone. The loser ﬁrms, in particu-
lar, were often extremely levered and at risk of bankruptcy.
In the sense of the Merton (1974) model, their common
stock was effectively an out-of-the-money option on the
underlying ﬁrm value. This suggests that potentially large
differences exist in the market betas of the winner and
loser portfolios that generate convex, option-like payoffs. 
3. Time-varying beta and option-like payoffs 
To investigate the time-varying betas of winners and
losers, Fig. 3 plots the market betas for the winner and
loser momentum deciles, estimated using 126-day ( ≈ six
month) rolling market model regressions with daily data. 4
Fig. 3 plots the betas over three non overlapping subsam-
ples that span the full sample period: June 1927 to De-
cember 1939, January 1940 to December 1999, and January
20 0 0 to March 2013. 
The betas vary substantially, especially for the loser
portfolio, whose beta tends to increase dramatically dur-
ing volatile periods. The ﬁrst and third plots highlight the
betas several years before, during, and after the momen-
tum crashes. The beta of the winner portfolio is some-
times above 2 following large market rises, but, for the
226 K. Daniel, T.J. Moskowitz / Journal of Financial Economics 122 (2016) 221–247 
Fig. 2. Momentum crashes, following the Great Depression and the 20 08–20 09 ﬁnancial crisis. These plots show the cumulative daily returns to four 
portfolios: (1) the risk-free asset, (2) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index, (3) the bottom decile past loser portfolio; and 
(4) the top decile past winner portfolio over the period from March 9, 2009 through March 28 2013 (Panel A) and from June 1, 1932 through December 
30, 1939 (Panel B). 
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Table 2 
Worst monthly momentum returns. 
This table lists the 15 worst monthly returns to the winner-minus-loser 
(WML) momentum portfolio over the 1927:01–2013:03 time period. Also 
tabulated are Mkt-2y, the two-year market returns leading up to the port- 
folio formation date, and Mkt t , the contemporaneous market return. The 
dates between July 1932 and September 1939 are marked with an aster- 
isk ( ∗), those between April and August of 2009 with † , and those from 
January 2001 and November 2002 with ‡ . All numbers in the table are in 
percent. 
Rank Month WML t MKT-2y Mkt t 
1 1932:08 ∗ −74 .36 −67 .77 36 .49 
2 1932:07 ∗ −60 .98 −74 .91 33 .63 
3 2001:01 ‡ −49 .19 10 .74 3 .66 
4 2009:04 † −45 .52 −40 .62 10 .20 
5 1939:09 ∗ −43 .83 −21 .46 16 .97 
6 1933:04 ∗ −43 .14 −59 .00 38 .14 
7 2009:03 † −42 .28 −44 .90 8 .97 
8 2002:11 ‡ −37 .04 −36 .23 6 .08 
9 1938:06 ∗ −33 .36 −27 .83 23 .72 
10 2009:08 † −30 .54 −27 .33 3 .33 
11 1931:06 ∗ −29 .72 −47 .59 13 .87 
12 1933:05 ∗ −28 .90 −37 .18 21 .42 
13 2001:11 ‡ −25 .31 −19 .77 7 .71 
14 2001:10 ‡ −24 .98 −16 .77 2 .68 
15 1974:01 −24 .04 −5 .67 0 .46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The result that the betas of winner-minus-loser portfolios are non- 
linearly related to contemporaneous market returns has also been shown 
in Rouwenhorst (1998) who ﬁnds this feature for non-US equity momen- 
tum strategies (Table V, p. 279). Chan (1988) and DeBondt and Thaler 
(1987) show this nonlinearity for longer-term winner and loser portfolios. 
However, Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2011) , building on the re- 
sults of Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) , note that the interpretation of 
the measures of abnormal performance (i.e., the alphas) in Chan (1988) , 
Grundy and Martin (2001) , and Rouwenhorst (1998) are problematic and 
provide a critique of Grundy and Martin (2001) and other studies that 
overcondition in a similar way. 
6 Of the 1,035 months in the 1927:01-2013:03 period, I B,t−1 = 1 in 183, 
and ˜  I U,t = 1 in 618. loser portfolio, the beta reaches far higher levels (as high
as 4 or 5). The widening beta differences between winners
and losers, coupled with the facts from Table 2 that these
crash periods are characterized by sudden and dramatic
market upswings, mean that the WML strategy experiences
huge losses during these times. We examine these patterns
more formally by investigating how the mean return of the
momentum portfolio is linked to time variation in market
beta. 
3.1. Hedging market risk in the momentum portfolio 
Grundy and Martin (2001) explore this same question,
arguing that the poor performance of the momentum port-
folio in the pre-WWII period ﬁrst shown by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) is a result of time-varying market and size
exposure. They argue that a hedged momentum portfolio,
for which conditional market and size exposure is zero,
has a high average return and a high Sharpe ratio in the
pre-WWII period when the unhedged momentum portfo-
lio suffers. 
At the time that Grundy and Martin (2001) under-
took their study, daily stock return data were not available
through CRSP in the pre-1962 period. Given the dynamic
nature of momentum’s risk exposures, estimating the fu-
ture hedge coeﬃcients ex ante with monthly data is prob-
lematic. As a result, Grundy and Martin (2001) construct
their hedge portfolio based on a regression with monthly
returns over the current month and the future ﬁve months.
That is, the hedge portfolio was not an ex-ante imple-
mentable portfolio. 
However, to the extent that the future momentum-
portfolio beta is correlated with the future return of the
market, this procedure results in a biased estimate of the
returns of the hedged portfolio. We show there is in fact
a strong correlation of this type, which results in a largeupward bias in the estimated performance of the hedged
portfolio. 5 
3.2. Option-like behavior of the WML portfolio 
The source of the bias using the ex post beta of the mo-
mentum portfolio to construct the hedge portfolio is that,
in bear markets, the market beta of the WML portfolio is
strongly negatively correlated with the contemporaneous
realized market return. This means that a hedge portfo-
lio constructed using the ex post beta will have a higher
beta in anticipation of a higher future market return, mak-
ing its performance much better that what would be pos-
sible with a hedge portfolio based on the ex ante beta. 
In this subsection, we also show that the return of the
momentum portfolio, net of properly estimated (i.e., ex
ante) market risk, is signiﬁcantly lower in bear markets.
Both of these results are linked to the fact that, in bear
markets, the momentum strategy behaves as if it is effec-
tively short a call option on the market. 
We ﬁrst illustrate these issues with a set of four
monthly time series regressions, the results of which are
presented in Table 3 . The dependent variable in all regres-
sions is ˜ R WML ,t , the WML return in month t . The indepen-
dent variables are combinations of 
1. ˜ R e m,t , the CRSP value-weighted index excess return in
month t . 
2. I B,t−1 , an ex ante bear market indicator that equals one
if the cumulative CRSP VW index return in the past 24
months is negative and is zero otherwise; 
3. ˜ I U,t , a contemporaneous, i.e., not ex ante, up-market in-
dicator variable that is one if the excess CRSP VW index
return is greater than the risk-free rate in month t (e.g.,
R e m,t > 0 ), and is zero otherwise. 
6 
Regression 1 in Table 3 ﬁts an unconditional market
model to the WML portfolio: 
˜ R WML ,t = α0 + β0 ˜  R m,t + ˜ t . (1)
Consistent with the results in the literature, the estimated
market beta is negative, −0.576, and the intercept, ˆ α, is
both economically large (1.852% per month) and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant ( t -statistic = 7.3). 
Regression 2 in Table 3 ﬁts a conditional CAPM with the
bear market indicator, I B , as an instrument: 
˜ R WML ,t = (α0 + αB I B,t−1 ) + (β0 + βB I B,t−1 ) ˜  R m,t + ˜ t . (2)
This speciﬁcation is an attempt to capture both expected
return and market-beta differences in bear markets. Con-
sistent with Grundy and Martin (2001) , a striking change
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Fig. 3. Market betas of winner and loser decile portfolios. These three plots present the estimated market betas over three independent subsamples 
spanning our full sample: 1927:06 to 1939:12, 1940:01 to 1999:12, and 20 0 0:01 to 2013:03. The betas are estimated by running a set of 126-day rolling 
regressions of the momentum portfolio excess returns on the contemporaneous excess market return and ten (daily) lags of the market return and summing 
the betas. is evident in the market beta of the WML portfolio in bear 
markets. It is −1.131 lower, with a t -statistic of −13 . 4 on 
the difference. The WML alpha in bear market is 2.04% per 
month lower ( t -statistic = −3 . 4 ). Interestingly, the point es- 
timate for the alpha in bear markets (equal to ˆ α0 + ˆ αB ) is 
just below zero, but not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Regression 3 introduces an additional element to the 
regression that allows us to assess the extent to which 
the up- and down-market betas of the WML portfolio 
differ: ˜ R WML ,t = (α0 + αB · I B,t−1 ) 
+ (β0 + I B,t−1 (βB + ˜  I U,t βB,U )) ˜  R m,t + ˜ t . (3) 
This speciﬁcation is similar to that used by Henriksson and 
Merton (1981) to assess market timing ability of fund man- 
agers. Here, the ˆ βB,U of −0.815 ( t -statistic = −4 . 5 ) shows 
that the WML portfolio does very badly when the mar- 
ket rebounds following a bear market. When in a bear 
market, the point estimates of the WML beta are −0.742 
( = ˆ β + ˆ β ) when the contemporaneous market return is 0 B 
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Table 3 
Market timing regression results. 
This table presents the results of estimating four speciﬁcations of a 
monthly time-series regressions run over the period 1927:01 to 2013:03. 
In all cases the dependent variable is the return on the WML portfolio. 
The independent variables are a constant; an indicator for bear markets, 
I B,t−1 , which equals one if the cumulative past two-year return on the 
market is negative; the excess market return, R e m,t ; and a contempora- 
neous up-market indicator, I U, t , which equals one if R 
e 
m,t > 0 . The coef- 
ﬁcients ˆ α0 and ˆ αB are multiplied by 100 (i.e., are in percent per month). 
Coeﬃcient Variable Estimated coeﬃcients (t-statistics) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ˆ α0 1 1.852 1.976 1.976 2.030 
(7.3) (7.7) (7.8) (8.4) 
ˆ αB I B,t−1 −2.040 0.583 
( −3.4) (0.7) 
ˆ β0 ˜ R e m,t −0.576 −0.032 −0.032 −0.034 
( −12.5) ( −0.5) ( −0.6) ( −0.6) 
ˆ βB I B,t−1 · ˜ R e m,t −1.131 −0.661 −0.708 
( −13.4) ( −5.0) ( −6.1) 
ˆ βB,U I B,t−1 ·I U,t · ˜ R e m,t −0.815 −0.727 
( −4.5) ( −5.6) 
R 2 
adj 
0.130 0.269 0.283 0.283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The calculation of cumulative returns for long-short portfolios is de- 
scribed in Appendix A.1 . negative and = ˆ β0 + ˆ βB + ˆ βB,U = −1 . 796 when the market
return is positive. In other words, the momentum portfolio
is effectively short a call option on the market 
The predominant source of this optionality comes from
the loser portfolio. Panel A of Table 4 presents the esti-
mation of the regression speciﬁcation in (3) for each of
the ten momentum portfolios. The ﬁnal row of the ta-
ble (the ˆ βB,U coeﬃcient) shows the strong up-market be-
tas for the loser portfolios in bear markets. For the loser
decile, the down-market beta is 1.560 ( = 1 . 338 + 0 . 222 )
and the point estimate of the up-market beta is 2.160
( = 1 . 560 + 0 . 600 ). In contrast, the up-market beta incre-
ment for the winner decile is slightly negative ( = −0 . 215 ).
This pattern also holds for less extreme winners and losers,
such as Decile 2 versus Decile 9 or Decile 3 versus Decile
8, with the differences between winners and losers de-
clining monotonically for less extreme past return-sorted
portfolios. The net effect is that a momentum portfolio
which is long winners and short losers will have signiﬁ-
cant negative market exposure following bear markets pre-
cisely when the market swings upward and that exposure
is even more negative for more extreme past return-sorted
portfolios. 
3.3. Asymmetry in the optionality 
The optionality associated with the loser portfo-
lios is signiﬁcant only in bear markets. Panel B of
Table 4 presents the same set of regressions using the bull
market indicator I L,t−1 instead of the bear-market indica-
tor I B,t−1 . The key variables here are the estimated coef-
ﬁcients and t -statistics on βL, U , presented in the last two
rows of Panel B. Unlike in Panel A, no signiﬁcant asym-
metry is present in the loser portfolio, though the winner
portfolio asymmetry is comparable to Panel A. The net ef-
fect is that the WML portfolio shows no statistically signif-
icant optionality in bull markets, unlike in bear markets. 3.4. Ex ante versus ex post hedge of market risk for WML 
The results of the preceding analysis suggest that cal-
culating hedge ratios based on future realized betas, as in
Grundy and Martin (2001) , is likely to produce strongly
upward biased estimates of the performance of the hedged
portfolio. This is because the realized market beta of the
momentum portfolio is more negative when the realized
return of the market is positive. Thus, hedging ex post,
when the hedge is based on the future realized portfolio
beta, takes more market exposure (as a hedge) when the
future market return is high, leading to a strong upward
bias in the estimated performance of the hedged portfolio.
As an illustration of the magnitude of the bias, Fig. 4
plots the cumulative log return to the unhedged, ex post
hedged, and ex ante hedged WML momentum portfolio. 7
The ex post hedged portfolio takes the WML portfolio and
hedges out market risk using an ex post estimate of mar-
ket beta. Following Grundy and Martin (2001) , we con-
struct the ex post hedged portfolio based on WML’s future
42-day (two-month) realized market beta, estimated using
daily data. Again, to calculate the beta we use ten daily
lags of the market return. The ex ante hedged portfolio es-
timates market betas using the lagged 42 days of returns
of the portfolio on the market, including ten daily lags. 
Panel A of Fig. 4 plots the cumulative log returns to all
three momentum portfolios over the June 1927 to Decem-
ber 1939 period, covering a few years before, during, and
after the biggest momentum crash. The ex post hedged
portfolio exhibits considerably improved performance over
the unhedged momentum portfolio as it is able to avoid
the crash. However, the ex ante hedged portfolio is not
only unable to avoid or mitigate the crash, but also under-
performs the unhedged portfolio over this period. Hence,
trying to hedge ex ante, as an investor would in reality,
would have made an investor worse off. The bias in using
ex post betas is substantial over this period. 
Panel B of Fig. 4 plots the cumulative log returns of
the three momentum portfolios over the full sample pe-
riod from 1927:01 to 2013:03. Again, the strong bias in
the ex post hedge is clear, as the ex ante hedged portfo-
lio performs no better than the unhedged WML portfolio
in the overall period and signiﬁcantly worse than the ex
post hedged portfolio. 
3.5. Market stress and momentum returns 
A casual interpretation of the results presented in
Section 3.2 is that, in a bear market, the portfolio of past
losers behaves like a call option on the market and that
the value of this option is not adequately reﬂected in the
prices of these assets. This leads to a high expected return
on the losers in bear markets, and a low expected return
to the WML portfolio that shorts these past losers. Because
the value of an option on the market is increasing in the
market variance, this interpretation further suggests that
the expected return of the WML portfolio should be a de-
creasing function of the future variance of the market. 
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Table 4 
Momentum portfolio optionality. 
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients (t-statistics) from regressions of the monthly excess returns of the momentum decile portfolios and the winner- 
minus-loser (WML) long-short portfolio on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) value-weighted (VW) excess market returns, and a number 
of indicator variables. Panel A reports results for optionality in bear markets in which, for each of the momentum portfolios, the following regression is 
estimated: 
˜ R e i,t = [ α0 + αB I B,t−1 ] + [ β0 + I B,t−1 (βB + ˜  I U,t βB,U )] ˜ R e m,t + ˜  t , 
where R e m is the CRSP VW excess market return, I B,t−1 is an ex ante bear market indicator that equals one if the cumulative CRSP VW index return in the 
past 24 months is negative and is zero otherwise. I U, t is a contemporaneous up-market indicator that equals one if the excess CRSP VW index return is 
positive in month t , and is zero otherwise. Panel B reports results for optionality in bull markets where for each of the momentum portfolios, the following 
regression is estimated: 
˜ R e i,t = [ α0 + αL I L,t−1 ] + [ β0 + I L,t−1 (βL + ˜  I U,t βL,U )] ˜ R m,t + ˜  t 
where I L,t−1 is an ex ante bull market indicator (deﬁned as 1 − I B,t−1 ). The sample period is 1927:01-2013:03. The coeﬃcients ˆ α0 , ˆ αB and ˆ αL are multiplied 
by 100 (i.e., are in percent per month). 
Coeﬃcient Momentum decile portfolio 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 WML 
Panel A: Optionality in bear markets 
ˆ α0 −1.406 −0.804 −0.509 −0.200 −0.054 −0.050 0.159 0.260 0.294 0.570 1.976 
( −7.3) ( −5.7) ( −4.9) ( −2.4) ( −0.7) ( −0.9) (2.7) (4.1) (3.8) (4.6) (7.8) 
ˆ αB −0.261 0.370 −0.192 −0.583 −0.317 −0.231 −0.001 −0.039 0.420 0.321 0.583 
( −0.4) (0.8) ( −0.6) ( −2.1) ( −1.3) ( −1.2) ( −0.0) ( −0.2) (1.7) (0.8) (0.7) 
ˆ β0 1.338 1.152 1.014 0.955 0.922 0.952 0.974 1.018 1.114 1.306 −0.032 
(30.4) (35.7) (42.6) (49.5) (55.6) (72.1) (72.3) (69.9) (62.7) (46.1) ( −0.6) 
ˆ βB 0.222 0.326 0.354 0.156 0.180 0.081 0.028 −0.126 −0.158 −0.439 −0.661 
(2.2) (4.4) (6.5) (3.5) (4.7) (2.7) (0.9) ( −3.8) ( −3.9) ( −6.8) ( −5.0) 
ˆ βB,U 0.600 0.349 0.180 0.351 0.163 0.121 −0.013 −0.031 −0.183 −0.215 −0.815 
(4.4) (3.5) (2.4) (5.9) (3.2) (3.0) ( −0.3) ( −0.7) ( −3.3) ( −2.5) ( −4.5) 
Panel B: Optionality in bull markets 
ˆ α0 0.041 0.392 −0.249 0.222 0.089 0.048 0.097 0.079 0.188 0.388 0.347 
(0.1) (1.4) ( −1.2) (1.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.8) (0.6) (1.2) (1.5) (0.7) 
ˆ αL −1.436 −1.135 −0.286 −0.653 −0.303 −0.084 −0.164 0.164 0.239 0.593 2.029 
( −2.9) ( −3.1) ( −1.1) ( −2.9) ( −1.6) ( −0.6) ( −1.1) (1.0) (1.2) (1.9) (3.1) 
ˆ β0 1.890 1.664 1.459 1.304 1.188 1.097 0.992 0.877 0.860 0.754 −1.136 
(41.3) (49.6) (59.2) (64.5) (69.3) (80.5) (72.2) (58.7) (46.7) (25.9) ( −18.7) 
ˆ βL −0.545 −0.498 −0.451 −0.411 −0.308 −0.141 −0.078 0.133 0.285 0.670 1.215 
( −6.0) ( −7.4) ( −9.2) ( −10.2) ( −9.0) ( −5.2) ( −2.9) (4.5) (7.8) (11.5) (10.0) 
ˆ βL,U −0.010 −0.025 0.017 0.138 0.094 −0.006 0.136 0.021 −0.077 −0.251 −0.242 
( −0.1) ( −0.2) (0.2) (2.2) (1.8) ( −0.1) (3.2) (0.4) ( −1.4) ( −2.8) ( −1.3) To examine this hypothesis, we use daily market return 
data to construct an ex ante estimate of the market volatil- 
ity over the coming month, and we use this market vari- 
ance estimate in combination with the bear market indi- 
cator, I B, t-1 , to forecast future WML returns. We run the 
regression 
˜ R WML ,t = γ0 + γB , t −1 · I B , t −1 + γσ 2 m · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 
+ γint · I B · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 + ˜ t , (4) 
where I B is the bear market indicator and ˆ σ
2 
m,t−1 is the 
variance of the daily returns of the market over the 126 
days prior to time t . 
Table 5 reports the regression results, showing that 
both estimated market variance and the bear market 
indicator independently forecast future momentum re- 
turns. Columns 1 and 2 report regression results for 
each variable separately, and column 3 reports results us- 
ing both variables simultaneously. The results are con- 
sistent with those from Section 3.4 . That is, in peri- 
ods of high market stress, as indicated by bear mar- 
kets and high volatility, future momentum returns are 
low. Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 report re- sults for the interaction between the bear market indica- 
tor and volatility, in which momentum returns are shown 
to be particularly poor during bear markets with high 
volatility. 
3.6. Exposure to other risk factors 
Our results show that time-varying exposure to mar- 
ket risk cannot explain the low returns of the momen- 
tum portfolio in crash states. However, the option-like be- 
havior of the momentum portfolio raises the intriguing 
question of whether the premium associated with momen- 
tum could be related to exposure to variance risk because, 
in panic states, a long-short momentum portfolio behaves 
like a short (written) call option on the market and be- 
cause shorting options (i.e., selling variance) has histori- 
cally earned a large premium ( Carr and Wu, 2009; Chris- 
tensen and Prabhala, 1998 ). 
To assess the dynamic exposure of the momentum 
strategy to variance innovations, we regress daily WML re- 
turns on the inferred daily (excess) returns of a variance 
swap on the S&P 500, which we calculate using the VIX 
and S&P 500 returns. Section A.2 of Appendix A provides 
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Fig. 4. Ex ante versus ex post hedged portfolio performance. These plots show the cumulative returns to the baseline static winner-minus-loser (WML) 
strategy, the WML strategy hedged ex post with respect to the market, and the WML strategy hedged ex ante with respect to the market. The ex post 
hedged portfolio conditionally hedges the market exposure using the procedure of Grundy and Martin (2001) , but using the future 42-day (two-month) 
realized market beta of the WML portfolio using Eq. (4) . The ex ante hedged momentum portfolio estimates market betas using the lagged 42 days of 
returns on the portfolio and the market from Eq. (4) . Panel A covers the 1927:06–1939:12 time period. Panel B plots the cumulative returns over the full 
sample (1927:06–2013:03). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 details of the swap return calculation. We run a time-series
regression with a conditioning variable designed to cap-
ture the time variation in factor loadings on the market
and, potentially, on other variables. The conditioning vari-
able I B σ 2 ≡ (1 / ¯v B )I B,t−1 ˆ  σ 2 m,t−1 is the interaction used earlier
but with a slight twist. That is 
• I B, t-1 is the bear market indicator deﬁned earlier
( I B , t −1 = 1 if the cumulative past two-year market re-
turn is negative and is zero otherwise); 
• ˆ σ 2 
m,t−1 is the variance of the market excess return over
the preceding 126 days; and • (1 / ¯v B ) is the inverse of the full-sample mean of ˆ σ 2 m,t−1
over all months in which I B,t−1 = 1 . 
Normalizing the interaction term with the constant
1 / ¯v B does not affect the statistical signiﬁcance of the re-
sults, but it gives the coeﬃcients a simple interpretation.
Because ∑ 
I B,t−1 =1 
I Bσ 2 = 1 , (5)
the coeﬃcients on I Bσ 2 and on variables interacted with
I 2 can be interpreted as the weighted average changeBσ
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Table 5 
Momentum returns and estimated market variance. 
This table presents the estimated coeﬃcients ( t -statistics) for a set of 
time series regression based on the following regression speciﬁcation: 
˜ R WML ,t = γ0 + γB · I B,t−1 + γσ 2 m · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 + γint · I B , t −1 · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 + ˜  t , 
where I B,t−1 is the bear market indicator and ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 is the variance of the 
daily returns on the market, measured over the 126 days preceding the 
start of month t . Each regression is estimated using monthly data over 
the period 1927:07–2013:03. The coeﬃcients ˆ γ0 and ˆ γB are multiplied by 
one hundred (i.e., are in percent per month). 
Coeﬃcient Regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ˆ γ0 1.955 2.428 2.500 1.973 2.129 
(6.6) (7.5) (7.7) (7.1) (5.8) 
ˆ γB −2.626 −1.281 0.023 
( −3.8) ( −1.6) (0.0) 
ˆ γσ 2 m −0.330 −0.275 −0.088 
( −5.1) ( −3.8) ( −0.8) 
ˆ γint −0.397 −0.323 
( −5.7) ( −2.2) 
Table 6 
Regression of winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio returns on variance 
swap returns. 
This table presents the estimated coeﬃcients (t-statistics) from three 
daily time-series regressions of the zero-investment WML portfolio re- 
turns on sets of independent variables including a constant term and the 
normalized ex ante forecasting variable I Bσ 2 , and on this forecasting vari- 
able interacted with the excess market return ( ˜ re m,t ) and the return on a 
(zero-investment) variance swap on the Standard & Poors 500 ( ˜ re v s,t ). (See 
Subsection A.2 of Appendix A for details on how these swap returns are 
calculated.) The sample period is January 2, 1990 to March 28, 2013. t- 
statistics are in parentheses. The intercepts and the coeﬃcients for I Bσ 2 
are converted to annualized, percentage terms by multiplying by 25,200 
( = 252 × 100 .) 
Independent variable Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
α 31.48 29.93 30.29 
(4.7) (4.8) (4.9) 
I Bσ 2 −58.62 −49.16 −54.83 
( −5.2) ( −4.7) ( −5.3) 
˜ re m,t 0.11 0.10 
(4.5) (3.1) 
I Bσ 2 · ˜ re m,t −0.52 −0.63 
( −28.4) ( −24.7) 
˜ rv s,t −0.02 
( −0.4) 
I Bσ 2 · ˜ rv s,t −0.10 
( −4.7) 
 
8 Although beyond the scope of this paper, we also examine HML and 
SMB as the dependent variable in similar regressions. We ﬁnd that HML 
has opposite signed market exposure in panic states relative to WML, 
which is not surprising because value strategies buy long-term losers and 
sell winners, the opposite of what a momentum strategy does. The corre- 
lation between WML and HML is −0 . 50 . However, an equal combination 
of HML and WML does not completely hedge the panic state optionality 
as the effects on WML are quantitatively stronger. The details are pro- 
vided in Appendix B . in the corresponding coeﬃcient during a bear market, in 
which the weight on each observation is proportional to 
the ex ante market variance leading up to that month. 
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. In regres- 
sion 1 the intercept ( α) estimates the mean return of the 
WML portfolio when I B,t−1 = 0 as 31.48% per year. How- 
ever, the coeﬃcient on I Bσ 2 shows that the weighted- 
average return in panic periods (volatile bear markets) is 
almost 59% per year lower 
Regression 2 controls for the market return and condi- 
tional market risk. Consistent with our earlier results, the 
last coeﬃcient in this column shows that the estimated 
WML beta falls by 0.518 ( t -statistic = −28 . 4 ) in panic states. However, both the mean WML return in calm periods and 
the change in the WML premium in the panic periods 
(given, respectively, by α and the coeﬃcient on I Bσ 2 ), re- 
main about the same. 
In regression 3, we add the return on the variance swap 
and its interaction with I Bσ 2 . The coeﬃcient on ˜ rv s,t shows 
that outside of panic states (i.e., when I B,t−1 = 0 ), the WML 
return does not co-vary signiﬁcantly with the variance 
swap return. However, the coeﬃcient on I Bσ 2 · ˜ rv s,t shows 
that in panic states, WML has a strongly signiﬁcant nega- 
tive loading on the variance swap return. That is, WML is 
effectively short volatility during these periods. This is con- 
sistent with our previous results, in which WML behaves 
like a short call option, but only in panic periods. Outside 
of these periods, there is no evidence of any optionality. 
However, the intercept and estimated I Bσ 2 coeﬃcient in 
regression 3 are essentially unchanged, even after control- 
ling for the variance swap return. The estimated WML pre- 
mium in non-panic states remains large, and the change in 
this premium in panic states (i.e., the coeﬃcient on I Bσ 2 ) 
is just as negative as before, indicating that although mo- 
mentum returns are related to variance risk, neither the 
unconditional nor the conditional returns to momentum 
are explained by it. 
We also regress the WML momentum portfolio returns 
on the three Fama and French (1993) factors consisting of 
the CRSP VW index return in excess of the risk-free rate, a 
small minus big (SMB) stock factor, and a high book eq- 
uity to market equity (BE/ME) minus low BE/ME (HML) 
factor, all obtained from Ken French’s website. In addition, 
we interact each of the factors with the panic state vari- 
able I Bσ 2 . The results are reported in Appendix B , in which
the abnormal performance of momentum continues to be 
signiﬁcantly more negative in bear market states, whether 
we measure abnormal performance relative to the mar- 
ket model or to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model, with little difference in the point estimates. 8 
4. Dynamic weighting of the momentum portfolio 
Using the insights from Section 3 , we evaluate the per- 
formance of a strategy that dynamically adjusts the weight 
on the WML momentum strategy using the forecasted re- 
turn and variance of the strategy. We show that the dy- 
namic strategy generates a Sharpe ratio more than double 
that of the baseline $1 long/$1 short WML strategy and is 
not explained by other factors or other suggested dynamic 
momentum portfolios such as a constant volatility momen- 
tum strategy ( Barroso and Santa-Clara, 2015 ). Moreover, 
we employ an out-of-sample dynamic momentum strat- 
egy that is implementable in real time and show that this 
portfolio performs about as well as an in-sample version 
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 whose parameters are estimated more precisely over the
full sample period. 
We begin with the design of the dynamic strategy. We
show in Appendix C that, for the objective function of
maximizing the in-sample unconditional Sharpe ratio, the
optimal weight on the risky asset (WML) at time t −1 is 
w ∗t−1 = 
(
1 
2 λ
)
μt−1 
σ 2 
t−1 
(6)
where μt−1 ≡ E t−1 [ R WML ,t ] is the conditional expected re-
turn on the (zero-investment) WML portfolio over the
coming month, σ 2 t−1 ≡ E t−1 [(R 2 WML ,t − μt−1 ) 2 ] is the condi-
tional variance of the WML portfolio return over the com-
ing month, and λ is a time-invariant scalar that controls
the unconditional risk and return of the dynamic portfolio.
This optimal weighting scheme comes from an intertem-
poral version of Markowitz (1952) portfolio optimization. 
We then use the insights from our previous analysis to
provide an estimate of μt−1 , the conditional mean return
of WML. The results from Table 5 provide an instrument
for the time t conditional expected return on the WML
portfolio. As a proxy for the expected return, we use the
ﬁtted regression of the WML returns on the interaction be-
tween the bear market indicator I B,t−1 and the market vari-
ance over the preceding six months (i.e., the regression es-
timated in the fourth column of Table 5 ). 
To forecast the volatility of the WML series, we ﬁrst ﬁt
a the generalized autoregressive conditional heterostedas-
ticity (GARCH) model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan,
and Runkle (1993) —the GJR-GARCH model—to the WML re-
turn series. The process is deﬁned by 
R W ML,t = μ + t , (7)
where t ∼ N 
(
0 , σ 2 t 
)
and where the evolution of σ 2 t is gov-
erned by the process: 
σ 2 t = ω + βσ 2 t−1 + ( α + γ I(t−1 < 0) ) 2 t−1 (8)
where I(t−1 < 0) is an indicator variable equal to one if
t−1 < 0 , and zero otherwise. 9 We use maximum likeli-
hood to estimate the parameter set ( μ, ω, α, γ , β) over
the full time series (estimates of the parameters and stan-
dard errors are provided in Appendix D ). 
We form a linear combination of the forecast of future
volatility from the ﬁtted GJR-GARCH process with the re-
alized standard deviation of the 126 daily returns preced-
ing the current month. We show in Appendix D that both
components contribute to forecasting future daily realized
WML volatility. 
Our analysis in this section is also related to work by
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) , who argue that momen-
tum crashes can be avoided with a momentum portfo-
lio that is scaled by its trailing volatility. They further
show that the unconditional Sharpe ratio of the constant-
volatility momentum strategy is far better than a simple
$1-long/$1-short strategy. 9 Engle and Ng (1993) investigate the performance of a number of para- 
metric models in explaining daily market volatility for Japan. They ﬁnd 
that the GJR model that we use here best ﬁts the dynamic structure of 
volatility for that market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Eq. (6) shows that our results would be approximately
the same as those of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) if the
Sharpe ratio of the momentum strategy were time invari-
ant, i.e., if the forecast mean were always proportional to
the forecast volatility. Eq. (6) shows that, in this setting,
the weight on WML would be inversely proportional to
the forecast WML volatility – that is the optimal dynamic
strategy would be a constant volatility strategy like the one
proposed by Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) . 
However, this is not the case for momentum. In fact,
the return of WML is negatively related to the forecast
WML return volatility, related in part to our ﬁndings of
lower momentum returns following periods of market
stress. This means that the Sharpe ratio of the optimal
dynamic portfolio varies over time and is lowest when
WML’s volatility is forecast to be high (and its mean re-
turn low). To test this hypothesis, in Section 4.1 we imple-
ment a dynamic momentum portfolio using these insights
and show that the dynamic strategy outperforms a con-
stant volatility strategy. 
To better illustrate this, Fig. 5 plots the weight on the
($1-long/$1-short) WML portfolio for the three strategies:
the baseline WML strategy, the constant-volatility strategy
(cvol), and the dynamic strategy (dyn) with a WML weight
given by Eq. (6) . Here, we scale the weights of both the
constant volatility and the dynamic strategy so as to make
the full sample volatility of each return series equal to that
of the baseline WML strategy. Also, in the legend we indi-
cate the average weight on WML for each strategy and the
time series standard deviation of the WML weight by strat-
egy. 
By deﬁnition, the baseline dollar long-dollar short WML
strategy has a constant weight of 1. In contrast, the con-
stant volatility strategy WML-weight varies more, reaching
a maximum of 2.18 in November 1952 and a minimum
of 0.53 in June 2009. The full dynamic strategy weights
are 3.6 times more volatile than the constant volatility
weights, reaching a maximum of 5.37 (also in November
1952) and a minimum of -0.604 in March 1938. Unlike the
constant volatility strategy, for which the weight cannot go
below zero, the dynamic strategy weight is negative in 82
of the months in our sample, necessarily in months when
the forecast return of the WML strategy is negative. 
This result indicates that the dynamic strategy, at times,
employs considerably more leverage than the constant
volatility strategy. In addition, an actual implementation of
the dynamic strategy would certainly incur higher trans-
action costs than the other two strategies. These factors
should certainly be taken into account in assessing practi-
cal implications of the strong performance of the strategy. 
4.1. Dynamic strategy performance 
Panel A of Fig. 6 plots the cumulative returns to the
dynamic strategy from July 1927 to March 2013, in which
λ is chosen so that the in-sample annualized volatility
of the strategy is 19%, the same as that of the CRSP
value-weighted index over the full sample. For compari-
son, we also plot the cumulative log returns of the static
WML strategy and the constant volatility strategy, both
also scaled to 19% annual volatility. As Fig. 6 shows, the
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Fig. 5. Dynamic strategy weights on winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio. We plot the weight on the WML portfolio as a function of time for in static WML 
portfolio, the constant volatility strategy (cvol), and the dynmaic strategy (dyn). The ﬁgure legend reports the time series mean and standard deviation for 
the WML weight for each portfolio. dynamic portfolio outperforms the constant volatility port- 
folio, which, in turn, outperforms the basic WML portfolio. 
The Sharpe ratio (in parentheses on the ﬁgure legend) of 
the dynamic portfolio is nearly twice that of the static 
WML portfolio and a bit higher than the constant volatility 
momentum portfolio. In section 4.4 , we conduct formal 
spanning tests among these portfolios as well as other fac- 
tors. Consistent with our previous results, part of the out- 
performance of the dynamic strategy comes from its ability 
to mitigate momentum crashes. However, the dynamic 
strategy outperforms the other momentum strategies even 
outside of the 1930s and the ﬁnancial crisis period. 
4.2. Subsample performance 
As a check on the robustness of our results, we perform 
the same analysis over a set of approximately quarter- 
century subsamples: 1927 to 1949, 1950 to 1974, 1975 to 
1999, and 20 0 0 to 2013. We use the same mean and vari- 
ance forecasting equation and the same calibration in each 
of the four subsamples. Panels B–E of Fig. 6 plot the cu- 
mulative log returns by subsample and present the strat- 
egy Sharpe ratios (in parentheses) by subsample. For ease 
of comparison, returns for each of the strategies are scaled 
to an annualized volatility of 19% in each subsample. 
In each of the four subsamples,the ordering of perfor- 
mance remains the same. The dynamic strategy outper- forms the constant volatility strategy, which outperforms 
the static WML strategy. As the subsample plots show, part 
of the improved performance of the constant volatility, and 
especially dynamic strategy, over the static WML portfolio 
is the amelioration of big crashes. But, even over subperi- 
ods devoid of those crashes, there is still improvement. 
4.3. Out-of-sample performance 
One important potential concern with the dynamic 
strategy performance results presented above is that the 
trading strategy relies on parameters estimated over the 
full sample. This is a particular concern here, as our dy- 
namic strategy relies on the conditional expected WML- 
return estimate from the ﬁtted regression in column 4 of 
Table 5 . 
To shed some light on whether the dynamic strategy re- 
turns could have been achieved by an actual investor who 
would not have known these parameters, we construct an 
out-of-sample strategy. We continue to use Eq. (6) to de- 
termine the weight on the WML portfolio, and we continue 
to use the ﬁtted regression speciﬁcation in Column 4 of 
Table 5 for the forecast mean, that is, 
μt−1 ≡ E t−1 [ ˜  R WML ,t ] = ˆ γ0 ,t−1 + ˆ γint ,t −1 · I B , t −1 · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 , (9) 
only now the ˆ γ0 ,t−1 and ˆ γint ,t −1 in our forecasting speci- 
ﬁcation are the estimated regression coeﬃcients not over 
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Fig. 6. Dynamic momentum strategy performance. These plots show the cumulative returns to the dynamic strategy, (dyn), from Eqn. (6) , in which λ
is chosen so that the in-sample annualized volatility of the strategy is 19%, the same as that of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value- 
weighted index over the full sample. For comparison, we also plot the cumulative log returns of the static winner-minus-lower (WML) strategy and a 
constant volatility strategy (cvol), similar to that of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) , also scaled to an annualized volatility of 19%. Panel A plots the cumu- 
lative returns over the full sample period from 1927:07 to 2013:03. Panels B–E plot the returns over four roughly quarter-century subsamples: 1927–1949, 
1950–1974, 1975–1999, and 20 0 0–2013. The annualized Sharpe ratios of each strategy in each period are reported in parentheses in the corresponding 
legend. 
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Fig. 7. Mean forecast coeﬃcients: expanding window. We use the ﬁtted regression speciﬁcation in column 4 of Table 5 for the forecast mean; that is 
μt−1 ≡ E t−1 [ ˜ R WML ,t ] = ˆ γ0 ,t−1 + ˆ  γint ,t −1 · I B , t −1 · ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 , only now the ˆ γ0 ,t−1 and ˆ γint ,t −1 are the estimated regression coeﬃcients not over the full sample, but 
rather from a regression run from the start of our sample (1927:07) up through month t−1 (as indicated by the t−1 subscripts on these coeﬃcients). 
Table 7 
Strategy performance comparison. 
This table presents the annualized Sharpe ratios of ﬁve zero-investment 
portfolio strategies, based on the monthly returns of these strategies over 
the 1934:01–2013:03 time period. WML is the baseline winner-minus- 
loser momentum strategy. cvol is the constant volatility strategy, in which 
the WML returns each month are scaled by the realized volatility of the 
daily WML returns over the preceding 126 trading days. For the variance 
scaled portfolio, the WML returns each month are scaled by the realized 
variance of the daily WML returns over the preceding 126 trading days. 
For the strategy labeled “dyn, out-of-sample,” the WML portfolio weights 
each month are multiplied each month by w ∗ in Eq. (6) , where μt−1 is 
the out-of-sample WML mean-return forecast (in Eq. 9) , and σ 2 t−1 is the 
realized variance of the daily WML returns over the preceding 126 trad- 
ing days. The strategy labeled “dyn, in-sample” is the dynamic strategy 
discussed in Section 4.1 , with the parameters in the mean and variance 
forecast estimated over the full sample. The column labeled “Appraisal ra- 
tio” gives the annualized Treynor and Black (1973) appraisal ratio of the 
strategy in that row, relative to the strategy in the preceding row. 
Strategy Sharpe Appraisal 
ratio ratio 
WML 0.682 
cvol 1.041 0.786 
variance scaled 1.126 0.431 
dyn, out-of-sample 1.194 0.396 
dyn, in-sample 1.202 0.144 the full sample, but rather from a regression run from the 
start of our sample (1927:07) up through month t −1 . 10 To 
estimate the month t WML variance we use the 126-day 
WML variance estimated through the last day of month 
t −1 . 
Fig. 7 plots the coeﬃcients for this expanding window 
regression as a function of the date. The slope coeﬃcient 
begins only in October 1930, because the bear market in- 
dicator ( I B ) is zero up until October 1930. 
11 From January 
1933 until the end of our sample, the slope coeﬃcient is 
always in the range of −0.43 to −0.21.The slope coeﬃcient 
rises dramatically just before the poor performance of the 
momentum strategy in the 2001 and 2009 periods. These 
were bear markets (i.e., I B = 1 ) in which the market con- 
tinued to fall and momentum performed well. However, 
in each of these cases the forecasting variable eventually 
works in the sense that momentum does experience very 
bad performance and the slope coeﬃcient falls. Following 
the fairly extreme 2009 momentum crash, the slope coef- 
ﬁcient falls below −0.40 in August and September 2009. 
4.3.1. Out-of-sample strategy performance 
Table 7 presents a comparison of the performance of 
the various momentum strategies: the $1 long–$1 short 
static WML strategy, the constant volatility strategy, and 
strategy scaled by variance instead of standard deviation, 10 We have added t − 1 subscripts to these coeﬃcients to emphasize the 
fact that they are in the investor’s information set at the end of month 
t − 1 . 
11 Also, the intercept up to October 1930 is simply the mean monthly 
return on the momentum portfolio up to that time. After October 1930, it 
is the intercept coeﬃcient for the regression. the dynamic out-of-sample strategy, and the dynamic in- 
sample strategy. Next to each strategy (except the ﬁrst 
one), there are two numbers. The ﬁrst number is the 
Sharpe ratio of that strategy over the period from Jan- 
uary 1934 up through the end of our sample (March 2013). 
The second number is the Treynor and Black (1973) ap- 
praisal ratio of that strategy relative to the preceding one 
in the list. So, for example going from WML to the constant 
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Table 8 
Spanning tests of the dynamic momentum portfolio. 
This table presents the results of spanning tests of the dynamic (Panel A) and constant volatility (Panel B) portfolios with respect to the market (Mkt), the 
Fama and French (1993; FF) small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factors, the static wiinner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio, and each other 
by running daily time-series regressions of the dynamic (dyn) portfolio’s and constant volatility (cvol) portfolio’s returns on these factors. In addition, 
we interact each of these factors with the market stress indicator I Bσ 2 to estimate conditional betas with respect to these factors, which are labeled 
“conditional.” For ease of comparison, the dyn and cvol portfolios are scaled to have the same annualized volatility as the static WML portfolio (23%). The 
reported intercepts or αs from these regressions are converted to annualized, percentage terms by multiplying by 252 times one hundred. 
Coeﬃcient Factor Set 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A: Dependent variable = returns to dynamic (dyn) momentum portfolio 
Mkt+WML Mkt+WML FF+WML Mkt+cvol Mkt+cvol FF+cvol 
conditional conditional conditional conditional 
ˆ α 23.74 23.23 22.04 7.27 6.92 6.10 
t ( α) (11.99) (11.76) (11.60) (6.86) (6.44) (6.08) 
Panel B: Dependent variable = returns to constant volatility (cvol) momentum portfolio 
Mkt+WML Mkt+WML FF+WML Mkt+dyn Mkt+dyn FF+dyn 
conditional conditional conditional conditional 
ˆ α 14.27 14.28 13.88 −0.72 −0.15 −0.02 
t ( α) (11.44) (11.55) (11.28) ( −0.66) ( −0.13) ( −0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Because the optimal dynamic portfolio solved in Appendix C is not 
conditional on other factors, to form this portfolio in the presence of 
other factors we ﬁrst regress the static momentum portfolio on the other 
factors using daily returns and then use the residuals to form our dy- 
namic strategy by forecasting the conditional mean and variance of those 
residuals to form the dynamic weights. volatility strategy increases the Sharpe ratio from 0.682 to
1.041. We know that to increase the Sharpe ratio by that
amount, the WML strategy is combined with an (orthog-
onal) strategy with a Sharpe ratio of 
√ 
1 . 041 2 − 0 . 682 2 =
0 . 786 , which is also the value of the Treynor and Black ap-
praisal ratio. 
The last two rows of Table 7 show that going from
in-sample to out-of-sample results in only a very small
decrease in performance for the dynamic strategy. Going
from the constant volatility strategy to the out-of-sample
dynamic strategy continues to result in a fairly substantial
performance increase equivalent to adding on an orthog-
onal strategy with a Sharpe ratio of 
√ 
1 . 194 2 − 1 . 041 2 =
0 . 585 . This performance increase can be decomposed into
two roughly equal parts: one part is the performance in-
crease that comes from scaling by variance instead of by
volatility, and the other second component comes from
forecasting the mean, which continues to result in a sub-
stantial performance gain (AR = 0.396) even though we are
doing a full out-of-sample forecast of the mean return and
variance of WML. 
4.4. Spanning tests 
A more formal test of the dynamic portfolio’s success
is to conduct spanning tests with respect to the other
momentum strategies and other factors. Using daily re-
turns, we regress the dynamic portfolio’s returns on a host
of factors that include the market and Fama and French
(1993) factors as well as the static WML and constant
volatility (cvol) momentum strategies. The annualized al-
phas from these regressions are reported in Table 8 . 
The ﬁrst column of Panel A of Table 8 reports re-
sults from regressions of our dynamic momentum port-
folio on the market plus the static momentum portfolio,
WML. The intercept is highly signiﬁcant at 23.74% per an-
num ( t -statistic = 11.99), indicating that the dynamic port-
folio’s returns are not captured by the market or the staticmomentum portfolio. Because this regression controls only
for unconditional market exposure, the second column of
Panel A reports regression results that include interactions
of our panic state indicators with the market to capture
the conditional variability in beta. The alpha is virtually
unchanged and remains positive and highly signiﬁcant. The
third column then adds the Fama and French (1993) factors
SMB and HML and their interactions with the panic state
variables to account for conditional variability in exposure
to the market, size, and value factors. This regression ac-
counts for whether our dynamic portfolio is merely rotat-
ing exposure to these factors. 12 Again, the alpha with re-
spect to this conditional model is strong and signiﬁcant at
22% per year, nearly identical in magnitude to the ﬁrst two
columns. Hence, our dynamic momentum strategy’s abnor-
mal performance is not being driven by dynamic exposure
to these other factors or to the static momentum portfolio.
Columns 4 through 6 of Panel A of Table 8 repeat the
regressions from Columns 1 through 3 by replacing the
static WML portfolio with the constant volatility (cvol)
momentum portfolio. The alphas drop in magnitude to
about 7% per year but remain highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant ( t -statistic between 6 and 7), suggesting that the dy-
namic momentum portfolio is not spanned by the constant
volatility portfolio. 
Panel B of Table 8 ﬂips the analysis around and exam-
ines whether the constant volatility portfolio is spanned by
the static WML portfolio or the dynamic portfolio. The ﬁrst
three columns of Panel B indicate that the constant volatil-
ity portfolio is not spanned by the static WML portfolio or
the Fama and French (1993) factors, generating alphas of
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 about 14% per annum with highly signiﬁcant t -statistics. 
These results are consistent with Barroso and Santa-Clara 
(2015) . However, the alphas of the constant volatility port- 
folio are slightly smaller in magnitude than those from the 
dynamic strategy, consistent with the Sharpe ratio compar- 
isons from Fig. 6 . (Because we scale both the dynamic and 
constant volatility portfolios to have the same variance, 
these alphas are comparable and give the same rankings 
as information ratios would.) 
Columns 4 through 6 of Panel B report results from re- 
gressing the constant volatility portfolio’s returns on the 
dynamic portfolio’s returns. Here, the alphas are all zero, 
both economically and statistically, suggesting that the dy- 
namic portfolio spans the constant volatility portfolio. Ac- 
cording to Appendix C , this should be the case in the- 
ory, thus implying that we obtain decent ex ante forecasts 
of the conditional mean and variance of the static WML 
portfolio to form a dynamic strategy that reliably captures 
and improves upon the returns to a constant volatility and 
static momentum portfolio. 
5. International equities and other asset classes 
Price momentum was ﬁrst shown in individual equi- 
ties in the US. However, subsequent research has demon- 
strated the existence of strong momentum effects both 
among common stocks in other investment regions and in 
other asset classes (see Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen 
(2013) for a summary). 
We investigate whether the same momentum crash 
patterns we observe in US equities are also present in 
these other asset markets and whether our dynamic mo- 
mentum portfolio helps ameliorate these crashes and im- 
proves momentum performance in other markets. 
5.1. Data 
The data come from Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen 
(2013) and for equities cover the US, UK, Japan, and Conti- 
nental Europe. Details on data description and sources can 
be found in Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) . The 
US and UK data begin in January 1972 and Europe and 
Japan in February 1974, extending to May 2013. 13 We also 
examine a global equity momentum strategy (GE), which 
weights each region’s equity momentum strategy by the ex 
post volatility of the portfolio over the full sample, follow- 
ing Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) . 
The non-equity data also come from Asness, Moskowitz, 
and Pedersen (2013) . They contain equity country index fu- 
tures across 18 developed equity markets beginning in Jan- 
uary 1978, ten currencies across developed markets start- 
ing in January 1979, ten country government bonds begin- 
ning January 1982, and 27 different commodity futures be- 
ginning in January 1972. All series end in May 2013. 13 These data extend beyond the original sample period used in Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) , as the data are updated monthly follow- 
ing the same procedure for portfolio construction in Asness, Moskowitz, 
and Pedersen (2013) . The data are available from: https://www.aqr.com/ 
library/data-sets/value-and-momentum-everywhere-factors-monthly . In addition, we examine two composite portfolios: GA 
is a global momentum strategy across the non-equity asset 
classes, which weights each asset class momentum strat- 
egy portfolio by the ex post volatility of that portfolio. GAll 
is a global momentum strategy across all of the equity and 
non-equity asset classes, which weights the GE and GA 
portfolios by their ex post return volatilities over the full 
sample. 
The deﬁnition of the market index is different for each 
market and asset class. It is the MSCI local index for the 
US, UK, Europe, and Japan, the MSCI World index for coun- 
try index futures, an equal-weighted average of all country 
bonds for bond markets, an equal-weighted average of all 
currencies for currency markets, and the Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index (GSCI) for commodities. 
5.2. Cross-sectional equity momentum outside the US 
The portfolio formation procedure here is similar to 
that used earlier in the paper, except that, instead of taking 
the top and bottom decile portfolios, we use the Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) P3–P1 momentum portfo- 
lios, which is long the top third and short the bottom third 
of securities ranked on returns from month t − 12 through 
month t − 2 . Both the long and the short side of the port-
folio are value weighted. As shown in Asness, Moskowitz, 
and Pedersen (2013) , over this time period there are strong 
momentum effects in each of the regions except Japan. 
Panels A through D of Table 9 present the results of 
the regressions run in Section 2 , but for the other stock 
market universes. Panel A shows the estimated coeﬃcients 
and t -statistics from the regression speciﬁcation in Eq. (2) . 
Consistent with the results presented earlier, the market 
betas of the momentum strategy are dramatically lower 
in bear markets across the other stock markets as well. 
The strategies implemented using European and Japanese 
stocks have market betas that are approximately 0.5 lower 
during bear markets (with t -statistics of about −7). The UK 
momentum strategy beta falls by 0.2. The drop in this pe- 
riod for the US momentum strategy is 0.58, comparable 
to the WML portfolio over the longer 1927–2013 period. 
Globally, averaging across the US, UK, Europe, and Japan, 
the market betas of the momentum strategy are markedly 
lower in bear markets. 
The abnormal returns of the momentum strategies are 
signiﬁcantly positive in bull markets for all regions except 
Japan. Consistent with our analysis in Section 2 , the return 
is lower in bear markets in each region, although, using 
only the bear market indicator as a proxy for panic periods, 
none of the differences is statistically signiﬁcant over these 
shorter sample periods. 
Panel B investigates the optionality in the momentum 
strategy in bear markets using the regression speciﬁcation 
in Eq. (3) . Consistent with the longer period US results, 
there is statistically signiﬁcant optionality in bear markets 
in the European, UK, and Japan stock markets and globally 
across all markets. For this subsample and methodology, 
the optionality is of the right sign, but it is not statis- 
tically signiﬁcant for the US market. The negative beta 
of long-short momentum strategies is particularly acute 
when the contemporaneous market return is positive. That 
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Table 9 
Time series regressions for international equity markets. 
The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients and t -statistics from re- 
gressions of the monthly returns to a zero-investment equity momentum 
strategy in each region on the indicated set of independent variables. The 
estimated regression intercept ( α) and the coeﬃcients on I B and I Bσ 2 are 
all multiplied by 1,200 to put them in annualized, percentage terms. GE 
is a global equity momentum strategy that is a volatility-weighted port- 
folio of the four equity markets. The starting month of each return series 
is indicated in the table header; all series end in 2013:05. EU = European 
Union; JP = Japan; UK = United Kingdom. 
Variable Region, time period start 
EU, JP, UK, US, GE, 
1974:02 1974:02 1972:01 1972:01 1972:01 
Panel A: Alpha and beta in bear markets 
α 8.935 1.887 7.409 5.181 5.826 
(3.5) (0.5) (2.7) (1.9) (3.6) 
I B −3.549 −0.837 −6.827 −2.921 −4.920 
( −0.7) ( −0.1) ( −1.1) ( −0.5) ( −1.2) 
R e m 0.071 0.246 0.015 0.150 0.023 
(1.6) (4.8) (0.4) (2.7) (0.7) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.508 −0.527 −0.197 −0.584 −0.275 
( −7.1) ( −7.0) ( −3.1) ( −6.2) ( −4.6) 
Panel B: Optionality in bear markets 
α 8.935 1.887 7.409 5.181 5.826 
(3.6) (0.5) (2.7) (1.9) (3.6) 
I B 9.418 11.104 4.249 −0.266 5.019 
(1.2) (1.3) (0.5) ( −0.0) (0.8) 
R e m 0.071 0.246 0.015 0.150 0.023 
(1.7) (4.8) (0.4) (2.7) (0.7) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.302 −0.318 0.004 −0.540 −0.098 
( −2.7) ( −2.5) (0.0) ( −3.3) ( −1.0) 
I B I U R 
e 
m −0.418 −0.367 −0.306 −0.086 −0.342 
( −2.4) ( −2.0) ( −2.2) ( −0.3) ( −2.2) 
Panel C: Market-variance effects 
α 12.237 12.385 10.856 10.331 8.345 
(4.1) (2.5) (3.6) (3.4) (4.8) 
I B 1.445 4.554 0.213 6.018 2.254 
(0.3) (0.7) (0.0) (0.9) (0.5) 
ˆ σ 2 m −0.113 −0.221 −0.078 −0.204 −0.252 
( −2.0) ( −2.9) ( −2.6) ( −3.3) ( −3.7) 
R e m 0.115 0.280 0.020 0.215 0.041 
(2.5) (4.2) (0.5) (3.6) (1.2) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.391 −0.512 −0.182 −0.485 −0.206 
( −4.8) ( −6.5) ( −2.5) ( −4.8) ( −3.2) 
ˆ σ 2 m R 
e 
m −1.755 −0.734 −0.040 −2.361 −1.959 
( −2.6) ( −0.7) ( −0.2) ( −2.5) ( −2.2) 
Panel D: Bear-market—market-variance interaction effects 
α 10.286 5.333 8.627 7.084 6.720 
(4.4) (1.6) (3.4) (2.8) (4.5) 
I Bσ 2 −6.509 −9.910 −11.408 −11.055 −8.704 
( −2.0) ( −2.2) ( −3.2) ( −2.6) ( −3.6) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.306 −0.180 −0.176 −0.245 −0.177 
( −3.7) ( −1.8) ( −2.6) ( −2.4) ( −2.8) 
ˆ σ 2 m R 
e 
m −0.295 3.685 −0.600 1.839 −2.798 
( −0.2) (3.8) ( −0.8) (1.2) ( −1.2) 
I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m −0.056 −0.307 0.073 −0.261 0.036 
( −0.7) ( −3.2) (0.8) ( −2.4) (0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 This is the same market variance measure used earlier. However, for 
the European Union (EU), Japan, and UK, we have daily MSCI market re- 
turn data only for the time period from January 1990 on. Therefore, over 
the period from 1972:01 to 1990:06 in the UK and 1974:02 to 1990:06 in 
the EU and Japan, we use the realized monthly variance over the preced- 
ing six months, again annualized. is, momentum strategies in all regions across the world
exhibit conditional betas and payoffs similar to writing
call options on the local market index. 
In Panel C, we add as a conditioning variable the re-
alized daily market return variance, annualized, over thepreceding 126 trading days (six months): 14 
˜ R P 3 −P 1 t = [ α0 + αB I B,t−1 + αV ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 ] 
+ [ β0 + βB I B,t−1 + βV ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 ] ˜  R e m,t + ˜ t . (10)
Two interesting results emerge. First, higher ex ante mar-
ket variance is generally associated with more negative
momentum strategy betas. Second, higher market variance
is also associated with strongly lower future abnormal re-
turns to momentum, net of the market return. This last re-
lation is statistically signiﬁcant in all markets, and again is
consistent with our earlier results for the US market over
the longer period. 
In Panel D, we again use the I Bσ 2 ≡ (1 / ¯v B )I B,t−1 · ˆ σ 2 m
measure introduced in Section 3.6 , designed to capture
panic periods when the market has fallen and volatility is
high. In addition, in these regressions, we instrument for
time variation in market beta using I B,t−1 , ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 , and I Bσ 2 .
We run the regression 
˜ R P 3 −P 1 t = [ α0 + αB I B σ 2 ] 
+ [ βB I B,t−1 + βV ˆ σ 2 m,t−1 + βBV I B σ 2 ] ˜  R e m , t + ˜ t . (11)
The results in Panel D of Table 9 are consistent with our
earlier results for the US over the longer period. The coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction term I Bσ 2 is negative, economically
large, and statistically signiﬁcant in all markets and for the
global strategy. 
In summary, the results in Table 9 suggest that momen-
tum strategies in these different equity markets are also
short volatility and have signiﬁcantly lower abnormal re-
turns in panic periods characterized by poor lagged market
returns and high market volatility. 
One other point of interest is that, in Panels C and D of
Table 9 , the ˆ α for the Japan momentum strategy is consid-
erably larger, and in Panel C it is in fact signiﬁcant at a 5%
level. We explore the implications of this ﬁnding further in
Section 5.4 , where we apply a dynamic Japanese momen-
tum strategy that takes into account the forecastability of
both the expected return and volatilty. 
5.3. Cross-sectional momentum in other asset classes 
Evidence of the option-like payoffs of momentum
strategies in bear markets outside of US equities, and in ev-
ery other equity market we examine, gives credence to this
feature of momentum being a robust phenomenon and
not likely due to chance. For further robustness, we exam-
ine momentum strategies in the non-equity asset classes.
In addition to providing another out of sample test for
the option-like payoffs of momentum strategies in bear
markets, ﬁnding the same option-like asymmetry in these
asset classes would present a challenge to the Merton
(1974) explanation. 
Table 10 presents the results of time series regres-
sions for the non-equity asset class momentum strategies
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Table 10 
Time series regressions for other asset classes. 
The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients and t -statistics from re- 
gressions of the monthly returns to zero-investment momentum strate- 
gies in each asset class on the indicated set of independent variables. GA 
and GAll are, respectively, the global strategies across all non-equity asset 
classes and across all asset classes including equities, in which each as- 
set class and equity market is weighted by the inverse of their full sam- 
ple volatility. The estimated intercept and the coeﬃcients on I B,t−1 and 
I Bσ 2 are all multiplied by 12 × 100 to put them in annualized, percent- 
age terms. FI = ﬁxed income; CM = commodities; FX = foreign exchange; 
EQ = equity. 
Variable Asset class, time period start 
FI, CM, FX, EQ, GA, GAll, 
1983:02 1973:02 1980:02 1979:02 1973:02 1973:02 
Panel A: Alpha and beta in bear markets 
α 0.006 16.302 4.745 8.575 4.653 4.639 
(0.0) (3.7) (2.2) (3.8) (4.6) (5.0) 
I B 0.798 −10.470 −8.221 −0.575 −2.426 −3.294 
(0.3) ( −1.4) ( −2.5) ( −0.1) ( −1.1) ( −1.3) 
R e m 0.186 0.308 0.382 0.272 0.162 0.082 
(3.1) (4.1) (4.4) (6.0) (2.7) (1.9) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.362 −0.730 −1.092 −0.620 −0.485 −0.366 
( −2.7) ( −4.5) ( −8.6) ( −8.5) ( −3.9) ( −4.4) 
Panel B: Optionality in bear markets 
α 0.006 16.302 4.745 8.575 4.653 4.639 
(0.0) (3.8) (2.2) (3.8) (4.6) (5.1) 
I B 1.994 7.014 −4.096 6.248 1.142 3.746 
(0.6) (0.7) ( −0.9) (1.1) (0.4) (1.1) 
R e m 0.186 0.308 0.382 0.272 0.162 0.082 
(3.1) (4.1) (4.4) (6.0) (2.7) (1.9) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.278 −0.205 −0.911 −0.485 −0.222 −0.106 
( −1.4) ( −0.8) ( −5.0) ( −4.6) ( −1.2) ( −0.9) 
I B I U R 
e 
m −0.197 −1.102 −0.405 −0.312 −0.563 −0.605 
( −0.6) ( −2.5) ( −1.4) ( −1.7) ( −1.8) ( −2.9) 
Panel C: Market-variance effects 
α −0.297 20.050 7.527 9.277 5.835 5.963 
( −0.2) (3.5) (2.4) (3.8) (4.9) (5.9) 
I B 1.057 −9.022 −7.475 0.634 −0.759 0.554 
(0.4) ( −1.2) ( −2.2) (0.2) ( −0.3) (0.2) 
ˆ σ 2 m 0.136 −0.211 −0.503 −0.047 −0.756 −0.585 
(0.2) ( −1.1) ( −1.2) ( −0.7) ( −1.8) ( −3.0) 
R e m 0.278 0.522 0.429 0.299 0.201 0.104 
(2.1) (4.3) (4.0) (6.3) (3.0) (2.3) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.385 −0.712 −1.045 −0.549 −0.374 −0.267 
( −2.8) ( −4.4) ( −8.0) ( −6.6) ( −2.7) ( −2.8) 
ˆ σ 2 m R 
e 
m −55.971 −8.820 −9.702 −2.001 −23.842 −8.605 
( −0.8) ( −2.2) ( −0.8) ( −1.7) ( −1.2) ( −1.5) 
Panel D: Bear-market—market-variance interaction effects 
α 0.218 13.803 3.419 9.240 4.766 4.853 
(0.2) (3.7) (1.8) (4.7) (5.1) (5.6) 
I Bσ 2 0.026 −4.808 −4.655 −2.683 −2.308 −4.056 
(0.0) ( −1.2) ( −2.1) ( −1.2) ( −1.8) ( −2.8) 
R e m 0.263 0.772 0.672 0.384 0.238 0.128 
(1.9) (5.0) (3.0) (5.9) (2.0) (2.0) 
I B R 
e 
m −0.281 −1.207 −1.293 −0.669 −0.424 −0.303 
( −0.8) ( −4.8) ( −5.0) ( −6.4) ( −2.3) ( −2.7) 
ˆ σ 2 m R 
e 
m −46.141 −18.887 −60.175 −8.332 −49.075 −22.030 
( −0.6) ( −3.4) ( −1.4) ( −2.4) ( −0.7) ( −1.0) 
I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m −0.105 0.344 0.268 0.222 0.074 0.095 
( −0.3) (2.5) (1.3) (1.9) (0.4) (0.6) similar to those in Table 9 for international equities. First, 
the set of I B,t−1 · ˜ R e m coeﬃcients and t -statistics in the last 
row of Panel A shows that, in all asset classes, the momen- 
tum portfolio’s market beta is signiﬁcantly more negative 
in bear markets. The intuition that, following a bear mar- 
ket, the loser side of the momentum portfolio will have 
a high market beta remains valid in the non-equity as- 
set classes as well. The I B,t−1 coeﬃcients in the second 
row of Panel A also provide evidence weakly consistent 
with the earlier ﬁnding that market-adjusted momentum 
returns are lower following bear markets. The point esti- 
mates are all negative, except for bonds, but only in the 
currency market is the coeﬃcient signiﬁcant. 
Panel B assesses whether the optionality present in 
cross-sectional equity momentum strategies is also present 
in other asset classes. The I B,t−1 ˜ I U,t ˜  R e m,t coeﬃcient is nega- 
tive for each of the four asset classes and the two com- 
posite portfolios, but it is statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% 
level only for commodities. This result is intriguing. While 
a model such as Merton (1974) argues that equities should 
exhibit option-like features, it is not clear that such a 
model would easily explain the optionality present in com- 
modity futures and weakly in currency markets. 
Panel C of Table 10 estimates Eq. (10) for the other as- 
set class momentum strategies. The signs of the relation 
between lagged volatility and momentum strategy returns 
are again negative in the commodity (CM), currency (FX), 
and equity (EQ) futures asset classes. Panel D uses the in- 
teractive variable I Bσ 2 as an instrument for volatile bear 
markets. As in Table 9 , we control for variation in market 
beta associated with I B,t−1 , ˆ σ 2 m , and the interaction term 
itself. In all asset classes except ﬁxed income (FI), the coef- 
ﬁcient on this interaction term is negative, consistent with 
our previous ﬁndings in US and international equity mar- 
kets. However, except for FX and the GAll portfolio, the co- 
eﬃcient is not signiﬁcant at a 5% level. 
These ﬁndings are largely consistent with the results 
for US equities and for other equity markets. In addition 
to providing more robustness, these ﬁndings make it more 
diﬃcult to reconcile under a Merton (1974) –style theory, 
which is better suited for equity returns. 
5.4. Dynamic strategies in other markets and asset classes 
Given the robustness of the option-like features to mo- 
mentum in other equity markets and other asset classes, 
we examine the eﬃcacy of the dynamic momentum strate- 
gies constructed as in Section 4 to examine whether the 
dynamic strategy continues to perform well when imple- 
mented in these other asset markets. 
We form the dynamic momentum strategy as before 
using the ex ante expected return and volatility of the 
WML portfolio in each market using the instruments from 
the previous analysis—the interaction of the ex-ante bear 
market indicator for that asset class, I B,t−1 and the as- 
set class market volatility over the preceding six months 
to forecast the conditional expected return and volatil- 
ity. Precise speciﬁcations of the forecasting model and the 
GARCH model parameters for each asset class are given in 
Appendix D . 
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Table 11 
Dynamic and constant volatility momentum across asset classes. 
Panel A presents the annualized Sharpe ratios of monthly momentum strategies in each of the different asset classes and markets we study. For each asset 
class, WML (winner-minus-loser) denotes the baseline $1 long–$1 short static momentum strategy, cvol denotes the constant-volatility strategy in which 
the WML weights are scaled by the ex ante forecast volatility of the WML strategy, using daily returns over the prior six months to estimate volatility, 
and dyn is the dynamic, maximum Sharpe ratio strategy described in Appendix C , which dynamically weights the momentum strategy by the conditional 
Sharpe ratio using ex ante forecasts of the conditional mean and variance of the momentum strategy’s returns using our market stress indicators and past 
six-month volatility estimates. ∗ indicates a fully dynamic implementation in which the weighted combination of the dynamic strategies themselves is also 
employed to aggregate up to the global equity (GE) global asset class (GA) and global all (GAll) strategies that combine strategies across regions and asset 
classes. For all other global combinations, each of the component strategies is scaled to have equal volatility and then the strategies are equally weighted. 
Panel B reports the intercepts or alphas and their t -statistics from spanning regressions of the cvol and optimal dynamic (dyn) portfolios in each market 
and asset class on the static WML momentum strategy and on each other, within each market and asset class. Each spanning regression also includes 
the market portfolio for that asset class and the interactions of the market portfolio with the panic state indicator I Bσ 2 for each asset class to capture 
conditional variation in the betas. The starting date for each series is indicated in the table; all series end in 2013:05. EU = European Union; JP = Japan; 
UK = United Kingdom; FI = ﬁxed income; CM = commodities; FX = foreign exchange; EQ = equity. 
Series Asset class/market, series start month 
EU, JP, UK, US, GE, GE ∗ , FI, CM, FX, EQ, GA, GA ∗ , GAll, GAll ∗ , 
90:06 90:06 90:06 72:07 72:07 72:07 83:06 73:02 80:02 79:02 73:02 73:02 73:02 73:02 
Panel A: Annualized strategy Sharpe ratio (Skewness) 
WML 0.462 0.067 0.465 0.283 0.513 0.004 0.587 0.296 0.705 0.676 0.754 
( −0.34) (0.02) ( −0.62) ( −0.04) ( −0.34) ( −0.24) (0.01) ( −0.54) ( −0.18) ( −0.48) ( −0.33) 
cvol 0.886 0.160 0.751 0.519 0.732 0.020 0.686 0.423 0.800 0.791 0.942 
(0.55) ( −0.13) ( −0.02) ( −0.09) (0.13) ( −0.45) ( −0.07) ( −0.47) (0.05) ( −0.31) ( −0.18) 
dyn 1.130 0.416 0.891 0.646 0.752 0.956 0.066 0.803 0.653 0.843 0.973 1.028 1.139 1.223 
(0.97) (1.41) (0.36) (0.08) (0.33) (1.11) (0.06) (0.39) ( −0.20) (0.25) (0.11) ( −0.19) (0.20) (0.44) 
Panel B: Spanning tests 
Regression of cvol on WML, R e m and I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m 
α 5.44 3.09 6.14 5.09 2.77 0.11 2.01 1.34 1.47 0.58 0.86 
t ( α) (4.1) (1.8) (3.4) (4.3) (4.7) (0.4) (3.2) (3.4) (2.8) (4.4) (5.2) 
Regression of dyn on WML, R e m and I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m 
α 13.75 8.50 14.28 7.26 4.59 6.60 2.51 6.71 3.36 3.31 2.34 3.24 2.83 4.69 
t ( α) (4.9) (2.7) (3.7) (3.5) (4.8) (6.6) (2.5) (3.3) (2.9) (2.9) (4.5) (5.3) (5.3) (7.6) 
Regression of dyn on cvol, R e m and I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m 
α 9.01 7.27 8.99 3.00 1.95 4.48 2.48 3.98 1.84 1.30 1.59 2.68 1.77 3.97 
t ( α) (3.9) (2.4) (2.9) (1.9) (2.8) (5.3) (2.5) (2.5) (2.0) (1.8) (3.7) (4.7) (4.2) (6.9) 
Regression of cvol on dyn, R e m and I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m 
α 0.01 0.38 0.72 1.92 0.48 0.30 −0.21 0.14 −0.11 −0.02 −0.20 0.21 −0.16 −0.06 
t ( α) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (1.2) (0.7) (0.4) ( −0.2) (0.1) ( −0.1) ( −0.0) ( −0.5) (0.4) ( −0.4) ( −0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A of Table 11 reports the Sharpe ratio and skew-
ness (in parentheses) of the simple $1 long–$1 short WML
momentum strategy in each market and asset class, as well
as a constant volatility momentum strategy and the dy-
namic momentum strategy as described above. In addi-
tion, we report global combinations of the equity momen-
tum strategies across all markets (GE), the non-equity asset
classes (GA), and a combination of all equity markets and
non-equity asset classes (GAll). 
As Panel A of Table 11 shows, a marked improvement
in Sharpe ratio exists going from the static WML momen-
tum strategy to a constant volatility momentum strategy
to our dynamic momentum strategy in every single mar-
ket and asset class we study except ﬁxed income. In most
cases, our dynamic strategy doubles the Sharpe ratio over
the traditional static momentum portfolio. Furthermore,
our dynamic momentum strategy resurrects positive re-
turns in markets in which the typical momentum port-
folio has failed to produce positive proﬁts, such as Japan.
In Japan, the static, classic momentum portfolio delivers a
0.07 Sharpe ratio, but our dynamic momentum portfolio
in Japan produces a 0.42 Sharpe ratio. (Alas, even the dy-namic strategy does not deliver a signiﬁcant Sharpe ratio
for ﬁxed income.) 
The skewness numbers (in parentheses) are also in-
teresting, as the predominantly negative skewness of the
static momentum strategies across all markets is apparent,
but the dynamic momentum strategies deliver mostly pos-
itive skewness consistent with amelioration of the crashes
in plots of the returns to these strategies. 
We also report results for a fully dynamic portfolio that
is a weighted combination of the individual asset class
or market dynamic strategies, in which the weighs are
based on the ex ante conditional volatility of each com-
ponent strategy. That is, each of the component strate-
gies is scaled to have equal volatility (ex ante), and then
the strategies are equally weighted. In this way, we are
also using cross-sectional information on the strength of
the dynamic signal of each component strategy to build a
fully dynamic combination portfolio across all asset classes.
We denote these fully dynamic strategies with an asterisk
( ∗) in Table 11 . As the table indicates additional Sharpe
ratio improvement is evident from this additional twist
on our dynamic momentum strategies, providing another
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ance forecastability in enhancing the returns to momen- 
tum strategies. 
Panel B of Table 11 reports results from spanning 
tests of the static WML portfolio, the constant volatility 
strategy, and the dynamic strategy within each market 
and asset class. These daily return regressions also include 
interactions of the excess market return and the excess 
market return (for that asset class) interacted with the 
asset class speciﬁc panic state indicator I Bσ 2 to capture 
conditional variation in the betas. 15 The ﬁrst row reports 
alphas (and their t -statistics) of the constant volatility 
strategy on WML in each market and asset class, as well 
as globally across equity markets (GE), asset classes (GA), 
and all markets and asset classes (GAll). Consistent with 
the results of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) for US equi- 
ties, the constant volatility strategy delivers positive alpha 
relative to the static momentum strategy in every single 
market and asset class that is highly signiﬁcant (except 
Japan and ﬁxed income, where momentum does not yield 
statistically signiﬁcant positive returns to begin with). 
The second row reports alphas of the dynamic momen- 
tum strategy with respect to WML. Here too the alphas are 
all positive and statistically signiﬁcant and, in every single 
market and asset class, are larger than the constant volatil- 
ity momentum alphas. Because both the dynamic and con- 
stant volatility strategies are scaled to the same volatility, 
this suggests that the dynamic momentum portfolio of- 
fers improved mean-variance eﬃciency over the constant 
volatility portfolio, which it should according to theory. 
To test this notion more formally, the last two sets of 
rows of Panel B of Table 11 report the alphas from re- 
gressions of the dynamic strategy returns on the constant 
volatility strategy returns, and vice versa. The results are 
consistent with our previous ﬁndings. In virtually every 
market and asset class, the dynamic momentum portfolio 
delivers positive and statistically signiﬁcant alpha relative 
to the constant volatility strategy, suggesting that the con- 
stant volatility strategy does not span the dynamic strat- 
egy in any market or asset class. Conversely, in every mar- 
ket and asset class the constant volatility strategy fails to 
produce a signiﬁcant alpha with respect to the dynamic 
strategy, suggesting that the dynamic momentum strategy 
spans the constant volatility strategy in every market and 
asset class. These results, shown out-of-sample in eight 
other markets and asset classes, make a compelling case 
for the robustness of the dynamic momentum portfolio 
based on the optionality insights of momentum strategies 
in every market. 
Overall, the consistent evidence of the optionality of 
momentum strategies, conditional betas and return pre- 
mia, and the signiﬁcant improvement from our dynamic 
weighting scheme across many different markets and 
vastly different asset classes provides a wealth of out- of- 15 As with our spanning tests in Section 4 , the dynamic strategy used 
in Panel B is based on ex ante forecasts of the mean and variance of the 
residual from a regression of the WML strategy on the excess market re- 
turn R e m and the interacted market return I Bσ 2 R 
e 
m , using the panic state 
indicator and lagged residual variances as forecasting variables. See foot- 
note 12. sample evidence. Momentum crashes and their forecasta- 
bility by bear market and ex ante volatility measures are 
a reliable and robust feature of momentum strategies that 
can provide clues as to the underlying source of this return 
factor. 16 
6. Conclusions 
In normal environments, consistent price momentum is 
both statistically and economically strong and manifests it- 
self across numerous equity markets and a wide range of 
diverse asset classes. 
However, in panic states, following multi year market 
drawdowns and in periods of high market volatility, the 
prices of past losers embody a high premium. When poor 
market conditions ameliorate and the market starts to re- 
bound, the losers experience strong gains, resulting in a 
momentum crash as momentum strategies short these as- 
sets. We ﬁnd that, in bear market states, and in particu- 
lar when market volatility is high, the down-market be- 
tas of the past losers are low, but the up-market betas are 
very large. This optionality does not appear to generally 
be reﬂected in the prices of the past losers. Consequently, 
the expected returns of the past losers are very high, and 
the momentum effect is reversed during these times. This 
feature does not apply equally to winners during good 
times, however, resulting in an asymmetry in the win- 
ner and loser exposure to market returns during extreme 
times. 
These results are shown to be robust. We obtain con- 
sistent results in eight different markets and asset classes, 
as well as in multiple time periods. Moreover, these crash 
periods are predictable. We use bear market indicators 
and ex ante volatility estimates to forecast the conditional 
mean and variance of momentum strategies. Armed with 
these estimates, we create a simple dynamically weighted 
version of the momentum portfolio that approximately 
doubles the Sharpe ratio of the static momentum strat- 
egy and is not spanned by constant volatility momentum 
strategies or other factors, and we do so consistently in ev- 
ery market, asset class, and time period we study. 
What can explain these ﬁndings? We examine a vari- 
ety of explanations ranging from compensation for crash 
risk to volatility risk, to other factor risks such as the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, but we ﬁnd that none of these 
explanations can account fully for our ﬁndings. For eq- 
uity momentum, a Merton (1974) story for the option-like 
payoffs of equities could make sense, but the existence of 
the same phenomena and option-like features for momen- 
tum strategies in futures, bonds, currencies, and commodi- 
ties makes this story more challenging. Alternatively, these 
effects can be loosely consistent with several behavioral 
ﬁndings, in which in extreme situations individuals tend to 
be fearful and appear to focus on losses, largely ignoring 16 Although beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to 
see if other momentum-type strategies, such as earnings momentum in 
equities ( Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996 ), or time-series momen- 
tum in futures contracts ( Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012 ), or cross- 
momentum effects ( Cohen and Frazzini, 2008 ) exhibit similar features. 
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 probabilities. 17 Whether this behavioral phenomenon is
fully consistent with the empirical results shown here is
a subject for further research and would indicate that the
behavior of market participants in each of these markets
and asset classes is affected similarly, despite the fact that
the average and marginal investor in these various markets
are likely to be different along many other dimensions. 
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Appendix A. Detailed description of calculations 
A.1. Cumulative return calculations 
The cumulative return on an (implementable) strategy
is an investment at time 0, which is fully reinvested at
each point i.e., when no cash is put in or taken out. That
is, the cumulative arithmetic returns between times t and
T is denoted R ( t, T ). 
R (t, T ) = 
T ∏ 
s = t+1 
(1 + R s ) − 1 , (12)
where R s denotes the arithmetic return in the period end-
ing at time t , and r s = log (1 + R s ) denotes the log-return
over period s , 
r(t, T ) = 
T ∑ 
s = t+1 
r s . (13)
For long-short portfolios, the cumulative return is 
R (t, T ) = 
T ∏ 
s = t+1 
(1 + R L,s − R S,s + R f,t ) − 1 , (14)17 See Sunstein and Zeckhauser (2008) , Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and 
Welch (2001) , and Loewenstein (2000) . where the terms R L, s , R S, s , and R f, s are, respectively, the
return on the long side of the portfolio, the short side of
the portfolio, and the risk-free rate. Thus, the strategy re-
ﬂects the cumulative return, with an initial investment of
V t , which is managed in the following two steps. 
1. Using the $ V 0 as margin, you purchase $ V 0 of the long
side of the portfolio, and short $ V 0 worth of the short
side of the portfolio. Note that this is consistent with
Regulation T requirements. Over each period s , the mar-
gin posted earns interest at rate R f, s . 
2. At the end of each period, the value of the investments
on the long and the short side of the portfolio are ad-
justed to reﬂect gains to both the long and short side of
the portfolio. So, for example, at the end of the ﬁrst pe-
riod, the investments in both the long and short side of
the portfolio are adjusted to set their value equal to the
total value of the portfolio to V t+1 = V t · (1 + R L − R S +
R f ) . 
This methodology assumes that there are no margin
calls, etc., except at the end of each month. These calcu-
lated returns do not incorporate transaction costs. 
A.2. Calculation of variance swap returns 
We calculate the returns to a daily variance swap on the
S&P 500 using daily observations on the Standard & Poor’s
500 Index (SPX) and the VIX and daily levels of the one-
month Treasury bill rate. The historical daily observations
on the SPX and the VIX, beginning on January 2, 1990, are
taken from the Chicago Board Options Exhange (CBOE) VIX
website. 18 The daily one-month interest rate series is taken
from Ken French’s data library. 
The VIX is calculated using a panel of S&P 500 in-
dex options with a wide range of strike prices and with
two maturity dates, generally the two closest-to-maturity
contracts, weighted in such a way so as to most closely
approximate the swap rate for a variance swap with a
constant maturity of 30 calendar days. 19 The calculation
method used by the CBOE makes the VIX equivalent to the
swap rate for a variance swap on the S&P 500 over the
coming 30 calendar days. However, the methodology used
by the CBOE is to 1 annualize this variance (2) and take the
square-root of the variance (to convert to volatility), mul-
tiply by one hundred to convert to percentage terms. 
Given the VIX construction methodology, we can calcu-
late the daily return on a variance swap, from day t −1 to
day t , as 
R v s,t = D t 
[
1 
21 
(
252 
[ 
100 · log 
(
S t 
S t−1 
)] 2 
− VIX 2 t−1 
)
+ 20 
21 
(
VIX 2 t − VIX 2 t−1 
)] 
. (15)
D t is the 20 trading day discount factor. This is calcu-
lated as D t = (1 + r 1 m,t ) 20 / 252 , where r 1 m, t is the annual-
ized one-month treasury bill yield as of day t , from Ken18 The daily data for the new VIX are available at http://www.cboe.com/ 
micro/VIX/historical.aspx . 
19 See Exchange (2003) for a full description of the VIX calculation. 
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 French’s website. VIX t is the level of the VIX as quoted at 
the end of day t and S t is the level of the S&P 500, adjusted 
for all corporate actions, at the end of day t . The factors of 
252 and 100 in the equation are because the VIX is quoted 
in annualized, percentage terms. 
This equation is given a ﬂat forward variance curve. 
That is, we are implicitly making the assumption that the 
swap rate on 20 trading day and 21 trading day variance 
swap rates on day t are identical (and equal to VIX 2 t ). For 
the market, this approximation should be fairly accurate. 
Appendix B. Exposure to size and value factors 
We regress the WML momentum portfolio returns on 
the three Fama and French (1993) factors consisting of 
the CRSP VW index return in excess of the risk-free rate, 
a small minus big (SMB) stock factor, and a high BE/ME 
minus low BE/ME (HML) factor, all obtained from Ken 
French’s website. In addition, we interact each of the fac- 
tors with the panic state variable I Bσ 2 . The results are re- 
ported in Table B1 , in which the abnormal performance of 
momentum continues to be signiﬁcantly more negative in 
bear market states, whether we measure abnormal perfor- 
mance relative to the market model or to the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, with little difference in 
the point estimates. 
The next two columns of the table repeat the market 
model regressions using HML as the dependent variable 
instead of WML. For these regressions, we use the mod- 
iﬁed HML portfolio of Asness and Frazzini (2011) . Asness 
and Frazzini show that the Fama and French (1993) HML 
construction, by using lagged market prices in its BE/ME 
calculations, inherently induces some positive covariance 
with momentum. They advocate using the most recent 
(last month’s) price to compute BE/ME ratios in construct- Table B1 
Conditional estimation of winner-minus-loser (WML), high-minus-low (HML), and
This table presents the results of monthly time-series regressions. The depende
the HML–devil (HML-d) portfolio of Asness and Frazzini (2011) , the SMB portfolio
and 50% HML-devil. The independent variables are intercept α, the normalized
variable interacted with the excess market return and the Fama and French (1993
WML and SMB regressions and January 1927–December 2012 for the HML-d and 
annualized, percentage terms by multiplying by 1,200. 
Variable Dependent
WML HML-d 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
α 24.93 26.95 2.96 3.14
(8.6) (9.4) (1.8) (2.2)
I Bσ 2 −28.80 −26.94 9.32 6.57
( −5.8) ( −5.4) (3.3) (2.7)
r e m −0.17 −0.15 −0.0
( −3.3) ( −2.7) ( −0.6
I Bσ 2 · r e m −0.54 −0.44 0.33
( −12.9) ( −7.8) (16.3
r SMB −0.16 
( −1.9) 
I Bσ 2 · r SMB −0.18 
( −2.2) 
r HML −0.38 
( −4.8) 
I Bσ 2 · r HML 0.05 
(0.7) ing their HML factor, which they term HML-devil (HML- 
d), to examine the value effect separately from momen- 
tum. As Table B1 shows, the abnormal return of the HML 
portfolio increases in the panic states, the opposite of what 
we ﬁnd for momentum. This is not surprising for several 
reasons. First, momentum strategies buy past winners and 
sell past losers, while value strategies typically buy longer- 
term past losers and sell winners [see DeBondt and Thaler 
(1987) and Fama and French (1996) ]. Also, the correla- 
tion between HML-d and UMD is approximately -0.50. Fi- 
nally, this result is consistent with the intuition for why 
the market beta of the WML portfolio changes with past 
market returns. Because growth (low book-to-price) stocks 
have generally had high past returns and value stocks low 
past returns, the same intuition suggests that HML’s beta 
should be high when I B,t−1 = 1 , and it is. HML’s market 
beta is higher by 0.33 when I B,t−1 = 1 ( t -statistic = 16.3),
as indicated by the interaction term. More directly, the 
correlation of HML with the excess return on the market 
during panic states is 0.59, but during normal times it is 
−0 . 10 . Conversely, for the WML portfolio, the correlation 
with the market is 0.02 during normal times and −0.71 
when I B,t−1 = 1 . 
The next two columns of Table B1 repeat this exer- 
cise using SMB as the dependent variable. The premium 
on SMB is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in panic states 
as well, but its beta does not change signiﬁcantly during 
these states. This makes sense because size is a poor proxy 
for recent short-term performance. 
Finally, the last two columns run regressions for a 
50–50 combination of WML and HML-d following Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) , who show that a com- 
bination of value and momentum diversiﬁes away a va- 
riety of exposures including aggregate market and liquid- 
ity risks. Given the opposite-signed results for WML and  small-minus-big (SMB) premia. 
nt variable is indicated at the head of each column, and is either: WML, 
 return of Fama and French (1993) ; or (4) a portfolio which is 50% WML 
 ex ante forecasting variable I Bσ 2 ≡ (1 / ¯v B )I B,t−1 · ˆ σ 2 m , and this forecasting 
) HML and SMB returns. The sample is January 1927–March 2013 for the 
WML + HML-d portfolios. The coeﬃcients for α and I Bσ 2 are converted to 
 Variable; return series 
SMB WML+HML-d 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1.91 0.34 13.41 14.08 
 (1.5) (0.3) (10.0) (11.0) 
 5.33 5.44 −12.01 −11.13 
 (2.4) (2.6) ( −5.2) ( −5.1) 
2 0.21 −0.09 
) (9.4) ( −4.0) 
 −0.01 −0.11 
) ( −0.4) ( −5.8) 
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 HML-d on the panic state variables, it is not surprising that
a combination of WML and HML-d hedges some of this
risk. However, since the magnitude of the effects on WML
are much larger than those of HML, the net effect is still
a reduction in returns and a decrease in beta during panic
states for the momentum-value combination. 20 
Appendix C. Maximum Sharpe ratio strategy 
The setting is discrete time with T periods from
1 , . . . , T . We can trade in two assets, a risky asset and a
risk free asset. Our objective is to maximize the Sharpe ra-
tio of a portfolio in which, each period, we can trade in or
out of the risky asset with no cost. 
Over period t + 1 which is the span from t to t + 1 , the
excess return on a risky asset ˜ rt+1 is distributed normally,
with time- t conditional mean μt and conditional variance
σ 2 t . That is, 
μt = E t [ ˜ rt+1 ] (16)
and 
σ 2 t = E t 
[
( ˜ rt+1 − μt ) 2 
]
, (17)
where we assume that at t = 0 the agent knows μt and σ t
for t ∈ { 0 , . . . , T − 1 } . 
The agent’s objective is to maximize the full-period
Sharpe ratio of a managed portfolio. The agent manages
the portfolio by placing, at the beginning of each period,
a fraction w t of the value of the managed portfolio in the
risky asset and a fraction 1 − w t in the risk-free asset. The
time t expected excess return and variance of the managed
portfolio in period t + 1 is then given by 
˜ rp,t+1 = w t ˜  rt+1 ∼ N 
(
w t μt , w 
2 
t σ
2 
t 
)
. (18)
The Sharpe ratio over the T periods is 
SR = 
E 
[
1 
T 
∑ T 
t=1 ˜  rp,t 
]
√ 
E 
[
1 
T 
∑ T 
t=1 ( ˜ rp,t − r¯ p ) 2 
] , (19)
where the r¯ p in the denominator is the sample average per
period excess return ( 1 T 
∑ T 
t=1 ˜  rp,t ). 
Given the information structure of this optimization
problem, maximizing the Sharpe ratio is equivalent to solv-
ing the constrained maximization problem: 
max 
w 0 , ... ,w T−1 
E 
[ 
1 
T 
T ∑ 
t=1 
˜ rp,t 
] 
subject to E 
[ 
1 
T 
T ∑ 
t=1 
( ˜ rp,t − r¯ ) 2 
] 
= σ 2 p 
(20)
If the period length is suﬃciently short, then
E [( ˜ rp,t − r¯ ) 2 ] ≈ σ 2 t = E t 
[
( ˜ rt+1 − μt ) 2 
]
. With this ap-
proximation, substituting in the conditional expectations20 One possibility for the dominance of momentum here is that the 50–
50 momentum-value weighting is based on equal dollar allocation to both 
rather than equal risk allocation. Since momentum is more volatile than 
value, this may be tilting the overall exposure of the combination portfo- 
lio more toward momentum. for the managed portfolio from Eq. (16) to (17) gives the
Lagrangian: 
max 
w 0 , ... ,w T−1 
L ≡ max 
w t 
( 
1 
T 
T −1 ∑ 
t=0 
w t μt 
) 
− λ
( 
1 
T 
T −1 ∑ 
t=0 
w 2 t σ
2 
t = σ 2 p 
) 
. 
(21)
The T ﬁrst order conditions for optimality are 
∂L 
∂w t 
∣∣∣∣
w t = w ∗t 
= 1 
T 
(
μt − 2 λw ∗t σ 2 t 
)
= 0 ∀ t ∈ { 0 , . . . , T −1 } 
(22)
giving an optimal weight on the risky asset at time t of 
w ∗t = 
(
1 
2 λ
)
μt 
σ 2 t 
. (23)
That is, the weight placed on the risky asset at time t
should be proportional to the expected excess return over
the next period and inversely proportional to the condi-
tional variance. 
Appendix D. GJR-GARCH forecasts of volatility 
The construction of the dynamic portfolio strategy we
explore in Sections 4 and 5.4 requires estimates of the con-
ditional mean return and the conditional volatility of the
momentum strategies. To forecast the volatility, we ﬁrst
ﬁt a GARCH process to the daily momentum returns of
each asset class. We ﬁt the GARCH model proposed by
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) and summarized
by Eqs. (7) and (8) .The maximum likelihood estimates and
t -statistics are: 
Parameter: ˆ μ ˆ ω ˆ α ˆ γ ˆ β
ML-est 0.86 ×10 −3 1.17 ×10 −6 0.111 −0.016 0.896 
t-stat (14.7) (4.2) (14.4) ( −1.6) (85.1) 
We then regress the future realized 22-day WML return
volatility ˆ σ22 ,t+1 on the GJR-GARCH estimate ( ˆ  σGARCH , t ),
the lagged 126-day WML return volatility ( ˆ  σ126 ,t ), and a
constant. The ordinary least squares (OLS) coeﬃcient es-
timates and t -statistics are 
coeﬃcient: ˆ α ˆ σGARCH , t ˆ σ126 ,t 
coef. est. 0.0010 0.6114 0.2640 
t-stat (3.0) (16.7) (7.2) 
with a regression R 2 
adj 
= 0 . 617 . 21 The ﬁtted estimate of
ˆ σ22 ,t+1 is then used as an input to the dynamic WML port-
folio weight, as discussed in Sections 4 and 5.4 . 
The same estimation procedure is used to generate
a forecast of the future 22-day WML return volatility
in each of the alternative asset classes. The maximum-
likelihood GJR-GARCH parameter estimates and t -statistics21 The lag one residual autocorrelation is 0.013 ( t -statistic = 0 . 44 ), jus- 
tifying the use of OLS standard errors. Also, the t -statistics on the lag 2–
5 autocorrelations never exceed 1.14. The autocorrelation of the depen- 
dent variable of the regression ( ˆ σ22 ,t ) is large and statistically signiﬁcant 
( ˆ ρ1 = 0 . 55 , t -statistic = 24 . 5 ). This suggests that the autocorrelation in 
ˆ σ22 ,t results from its forecastable component. The residual from its pro- 
jection on the forecast variables is uncorrelated at any conventional sta- 
tistically signiﬁcant level. 
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Table D1 
Maximum likelihood estimates of GJR-GARCH model for momentum portfolios. 
Panel A presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of the coeﬃcients of the Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) –generalized autoregressive con- 
ditional heteroskedasticity (GJR–GARCH) model, given by Eqs. (7) and (8) , ﬁtted to daily returns for each of the momentum portfolios we examine in 
Section 5.4 . The estimates of the μ and ω coeﬃcients are multiplied by 10 3 and 10 6 , respectively. Maximum likelihood–based t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. For β , this t-statistic tests whether β = 1 ; for all other parameters, it tests whether the parameter is zero. Panel B presents the results of 
monthly regressions in which we regress the future one month daily volatility of the winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio on an intercept ( α), on the 
lagged 126-day WML return volatility ( σ 126 ), and on the lagged GJR-GARCH volatility ( σ GARCH ). The starting date for each series is indicated in the table. 
All equity series end on 2013:05:31, and all asset-class series end on 2013:06:03. EU = European Union; JP = Japan; UK = United Kingdom; GLE = global 
equity; FI = ﬁxed income; CM = commodities; FX = foreign exchange; EQ = equity; GA = global asset class; GAll = Global Asset Class + Equity 
Coeﬃcient Asset class/market, series start date 
EU, JP, UK, US, GLE, FI, CM, FX, EQ, GA, GAll, 
90:01:02 90:01:02 90:01:02 72:02:01 72:02:01 83:01:03 72:02:01 79:01:01 78:01:02 72:02:01 72:02:01 
Panel A: GJR–GARCH coeﬃcient estimates 
μ( × 10 3 ) 0.387 0.187 0.316 0.314 0.124 0.024 0.516 0.238 0.322 0.154 0.159 
(5.3) (3.0) (3.4) (6.2) (6.7) (0.6) (5.0) (4.2) (5.3) (5.8) (5.6) 
ω( × 10 6 ) 0.569 0.616 0.364 0.298 0.024 0.027 1.525 0.455 0.619 0.034 0.035 
(2.4) (4.3) (3.3) (4.1) (3.3) (1.4) (4.1) (4.3) (3.9) (1.6) (1.6) 
α 0.089 0.160 0.094 0.104 0.107 0.060 0.055 0.092 0.074 0.037 0.046 
(6.4) (9.8) (7.7) (12.4) (12.1) (4.1) (9.0) (9.0) (6.9) (3.7) (4.2) 
γ −0.020 −0.007 −0.022 −0.026 −0.024 −0.002 −0.008 −0.020 −0.002 −0.011 −0.007 
( −1.6) ( −1.6) ( −2.0) ( −2.8) ( −2.0) ( −1.6) ( −2.3) ( −1.8) ( −1.6) ( −1.6) ( −0.8) 
β 0.912 0.848 0.918 0.907 0.909 0.945 0.940 0.909 0.916 0.966 0.955 
( −5.9) ( −11.4) ( −8.9) ( −11.1) ( −11.4) ( −4.2) ( −8.1) ( −9.6) ( −7.1) ( −2.9) ( −3.2) 
Panel B: Time series regression coeﬃcient estimates 
α( × 10 2 ) 0.053 0.083 0.067 0.036 0.016 0.082 0.177 0.144 0.096 0.065 0.034 
(1.3) (1.8) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (4.7) (3.0) (4.4) (2.8) (4.0) (2.8) 
ˆ σ126 0.334 0.126 0.159 0.227 0.280 0.475 0.161 0.125 0.233 0.113 0.180 
(4.7) (1.8) (2.1) (4.3) (5.1) (5.7) (2.2) (1.8) (3.5) (1.1) (2.2) 
ˆ σGARCH 0.561 0.754 0.758 0.682 0.632 0.220 0.665 0.581 0.594 0.637 0.655 
(8.0) (11.4) (9.9) (13.1) (11.6) (2.9) (9.1) (9.3) (9.2) (6.1) (7.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and regression estimates and t -statistics are presented in 
Table D1 . 
The parameters above and in Table D1 tell an inter- 
esting story. First, in the regressions, the coeﬃcient on 
the GJR-GARCH estimate of volatility is always signiﬁcant, 
and the coeﬃcient on the lagged 126-day volatility is al- 
ways smaller but not always statistically signiﬁcant. There 
appears to be a longer-lived component of volatility that 
ˆ σ126 ,t is capturing. 
Also interesting is the leverage parameter γ . In each of 
the asset classes, the maximum-likelihood estimate of γ
is negative, which means that a strong negative return on 
the WML portfolio is generally associated with a decrease 
in the WML return variance. As noted elsewhere in the lit- 
erature, this coeﬃcient is positive at high levels of statis- 
tical signiﬁcance for the market return (see, e.g., Glosten, 
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) and Engle and Ng (1993) ). 
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